

Changes in the Neighborhood: Reviewing Citizen Security Cooperation in Latin America



Robert Muggah and Ilona Szabo de Carvalho¹



PHOTO: POLICÍA NACIONAL DE LOS COLOMBIANOS

Colombian military and police officials are today deeply involved in training Latin American security forces.

Latin American and Caribbean countries are experiencing a major transformation in how they cooperate to achieve security and development. On the one hand, reductions in international aid from North America and Western Europe are precipitating regional shifts in regional and domestic priorities. Foreign assistance was traditionally devoted toward mitigating transnational threats such as drug cartels in the Andean region and is increasingly being redirected toward addressing regional and domestic risks among a small group of Central American and Caribbean countries. There is a growing appetite among bilateral agencies, multilateral organizations and national and local governments in adopting preventive approaches to the region's security challenges. The broadening out of conceptions of security is forcing a recalibration of cooperation strategies, including more emphasis on south-south, triangular and regionalized forms of assistance. Latin American and Caribbean countries are beginning to chart a new course with powerhouses such as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico actively exporting their citizen security models across their neighborhood. This Strategic Paper represents the most exhaustive treatment to date of the changing landscapes of international cooperation for citizen security in the region.

¹ Robert Muggah is the research director of the Igarapé Institute and Ilona Szabo is the executive director of the Igarapé Institute. They would like to thank several scholars and practitioners, not least Nathalie Alvarado, Desmond Arias, Jean Daudelin, Bernardo Sorj, Raphael Fernández de Castro Medina and other anonymous reviewers, for their contributions to this paper.

Changes in the Neighborhood: Reviewing Citizen Security Cooperation in Latin America

Robert Muggah And Ilona Szabo de Carvalho

INTRODUCTION

The Latin American neighborhood is experiencing an energetic expansion of international cooperation focused on security and development, including what is known regionally as “citizen security”. There are many reasons for this. On the one hand, political elites and civil societies are urgently seeking new ways to stem accelerating rates of violence across the region. On the other, the spread of regional networks alongside steady economic growth is emboldening countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and others to solve their own problems in their own ways. What is more, many Central and South American governments are displaying greater independence from - and in some cases opposition to - traditional powerhouses like the United States and the European Union and a more pragmatic relationship with newer ones such as China and Russia.² Taken together, Latin America is home to an increasingly diverse array of sub-regional organizations that are prioritizing, if only rhetorically, public safety and security. And while the United States and to a lesser extent entities such as the Organization of American States (OAS) continue to play a dominant role in shaping the direction and character of security priorities, there are nevertheless new emerging patterns of cooperation that privilege transnational, national and local priorities over international ones.

Given its inherently dynamic character, international cooperation for citizen security is easier described than defined. In Latin America such cooperation encompasses a wide array of thematic priorities and is managed through a bewildering array of bureaucratic modalities. At the most general level, such cooperation consists of the exchange of ideas, assistance and experience. It is transmitted through a veritable ecosystem of official and non-governmental institutions and investors. International cooperation for citizen security is therefore manifest in the dense web of interactions between the eighteen countries of Central and South America and literally hundreds of multilateral and bilateral agencies, banks, national and municipal governments, regional bodies, police and justice associations, non-governmental organizations, businesses and foundations, and civil societies. The sheer scope and scale of this cooperation is difficult to conceive. This *Strategic Paper* is a preliminary attempt to frame the concept and assess transforming patterns across the region.

In order to survey past trends and future trajectories of international cooperation for citizen security, it is essential to establish some basic parameters. At a minimum, such cooperation entails the transfer of resources, equipment, intelligence and expertise from one party to another. Parties can include national, state and municipal governments, defense personnel, police forces, intelligence units, judicial services, penal systems, universities, civic associations, private companies and others. Citizen security, itself a relatively new addition to the development lexicon, incorporates a complex set of interventions at the axis of security and development intended to mitigate transnational, national

2 Although the US remains the single largest trading partner with receipts of some \$800 billion in 2011, total Chinese trade with Latin American grew from some \$18 billion in 2002 to about \$240 billion in 2011. See United States CRS (2013, 6).

and local threats to personal safety. Very generally, citizen security includes a number of *hard measures* - including efforts to control transnational gangs, reduce illicit arms transfers, and counter human trafficking, money laundering, and cyber-crime. Citizen security is also commonly advanced through *softer measures* such as police and judicial reform, community and proximity policing, youth and gender violence reduction, and preventive measures to reduce routine threats to citizens. It is a recognition of the ways in which transnational and local security intersects and the explicit preoccupation with the safety and security of people that differentiates citizen security from competing paradigms such as “international”, “national”, “public” or “human” security.

International cooperation for citizen security operates at many levels. Much like an onion, distinct layers can be peeled off to reveal their specific form and function. To restrict the analysis to just one tier at the expense of others would be to miss the entirety of such cooperation. This *Strategic Paper* proposes a generic framework for assessing different forms of international cooperation for citizen security. As the framework demonstrates, the dominant type of international cooperation for citizen security in Latin America - measured in relation to material assistance - encompasses United States support for counter-narcotics and fighting organized crime. Although today labeled as “citizen security” (by U.S. authorities), it tends to reflect more traditional understandings of security privileging national institutions over local ones. Other significant forms of cooperation emphasizing both hard and soft measures include bilateral and multilateral aid, followed by non-governmental and private sector assistance, regional and sub-regional collaboration and south-south exchanges. These discrete forms of international cooperation are not autonomous: they co-exist and overlap. Nor are modalities necessarily complementary - in fact, the reverse is often true.

The *Strategic Paper* singles out a number of dominant trends in international cooperation for citizen security.

A focus of international cooperation for security promotion in Latin America has been on mitigating transnational threats, especially fighting drug production and trafficking and combating organized crime. Over the past two decades the United States has devoted over \$10 billion to supporting a small number of countries such as Mexico and others in Central America, Colombia and the Andean region to mount counter-narcotics initiatives and crack down on drug trafficking organizations. Overall spending has declined over the past decade. And while modest given US defense investments globally and even in comparison to annual expenditures by countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, their commitment is tantamount to the total flow of aid from all other donors combined. Although the focus on transnational threats is shaped by the domestic priorities of the United States, it has profoundly influenced the debate on public security priorities in Colombia, Mexico and many countries in Central America. In recent years, the United States has started re-packaging this assistance as “citizen security”.

An important shift in the form and function of international cooperation is taking place among most bilateral and multilateral actors in Latin America. Owing to the economic rise of Latin American countries, donor countries are recalibrating their partnerships away from development and towards political and trade cooperation. Meanwhile, states in Central and South America are also actively seeking to deepen inter- and intra-regional cooperation and exchange of experience and expertise. For their part, countries such as United States and those in the European Union are increasingly advocating for “balanced” citizen security strategies that emphasize both transnational and localized threats. There is a perceptible re-concentration of assistance in a smaller selection of lesser developed countries and simultaneous push to enhance regional solutions. While this re-alignment is supported by Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, many Central American countries continue to be more dependent on the United States.

The growing commitment to citizen security in Latin America is contributing to the gradual transformation in the character of international cooperation. The concept of citizen security is purposefully broadening how “security” is conceptualized by governments and societies. It expands focus from a narrow preoccupation with transnational and national priorities and threats to also account for more parochial local ones. It provokes a wider treatment of security, one that takes account of both international and local factors shaping safety and wellbeing. In most countries across Latin America, the adoption of regional and national plans and policies emphasizing citizen security is forcing a recalibration of cooperation strategies. They are inspiring states to focus not just on repression to generate short-term results, but also on preventive strategies designed to empower citizens and promote resilience in the long-term. In this way, they are seeking to bridge democratic deficits and restore and repair the state-citizen relationship.



Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (at podium) addresses the inauguration ceremony of the 37th regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Panama City, Panama.

UN PHOTO/EVAN SCHNEIDER

There is an apparent regionalization of citizen security responses in Latin America, particularly in relation to issues such as illegal drugs, gangs, arms smuggling, human trafficking and cyber-crime. The articulation and response to transnational security threats in Latin America were traditionally shaped by the United States with, in some cases, the imprimatur of the OAS. Lately, Latin American countries are reformulating risks and constructing responses through sub-regional organizations. Institutions such as the Andean Community (CAN), Bolivian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (CELAC), the South American Common Market (Mercosur), and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) are in some cases openly challenging the hegemony

of the United States. In other cases, the OAS is being side-stepped altogether. And while these regional strategies are nascent and reflect heterogeneous priorities, there appears to be a conscious effort to re-conceptualize Latin America as a common security community.³

Latin American countries are charting a new course in relation to international cooperation for citizen security. Indeed, the region is at the epicenter of a global debate on drug policy and calling for alternative approaches that promotes public health and violence reduction over repression and incarceration.⁴ There is considerable evidence of how militarized approaches that privilege conventional security approaches to drug control are instead generating insecurity, governance deficits, corruption, expanding prison populations, and contagion among neighbors.⁵ A number of Latin American governments and societies are calling instead for alternatives to the *status quo* and citizen security policies tailored to their own domestic realities. And while the United States continues to exert a heavy influence, particularly in terms of intelligence sharing and material assistance, new forums of international cooperation are calling for exchanges in technical capacity. Countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are actively seeking to export their citizen security models in their neighborhood, and beyond.

This *Strategic Paper* considers the changing characteristics of international cooperation for citizen security across Latin America. The first section sets out the conceptual parameters of international cooperation in order to explain its basic components. Section two highlights the complex politics that shape international cooperation and how these are changing. In section three, the focus is on cooperation to mitigate transnational threats, principally U.S.-led support to Latin America in the fight against illegal drugs and organized crime such as small arms and human trafficking, money laundering and cyber-crime. Next, section four considers the wide range of international cooperation from bilateral and multilateral actors to address more localized threats such as youth and gender-based violence and state repression. Section five addresses some of the challenges accompanying international cooperation for citizen security, not least in relation to issues of competing ideologies, high levels of dependency, and limited absorptive capacity. The *Strategic Paper* does not offer a comprehensive treatment of international cooperation for citizen security, but rather a cursory overview of its dominant characteristics and how it is evolving in the early decades of the twenty first century.

3 See Deusch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) for more on “security communities”. See also the recent article of Amorim (2013). The concept is intended to make the idea of war unthinkable.

4 See Szabo (2014), Szabo, Garzon and Muggah (2013), and also the Global Commission on Drug Policy at <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/>.

5 See Garzon (2013) and Szabo (2014, 2013) for a review of the evidence.

SECTION I

WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR CITIZEN SECURITY?

Citizen security encompasses an array of ideas, policies and activities intended to promote safety and security, strengthen social cohesion and reinforce the mutual rights and obligations of states *and* citizens. In practical terms, citizen security consists of the organization and delivery of effective public safety measures in the context of broader democratic norms.⁶ It is thus markedly distinct from national security and public order paradigms advocating more muscular and state-based approaches to policing and crime control. Citizen security is also gaining greater attention, not least owing to emerging evidence that effective public security and safety is best achieved through the strengthening of the rule of law alongside the guarantee of basic human rights.⁷ This is not to say that citizen security is universally accepted. Indeed, there are popular calls in many Latin American countries for more repressive policing and vigilante actions. State power continues to be exercised in defense of narrow elite interests. It is precisely these attitudes and tendencies that proponents of citizen security are seeking to reverse. At its most basic, citizen security features two fundamental ideas - *the responsible state* and *active citizenship*.

A core pillar of citizen security is the *responsible state*. The notion of sovereignty as responsibility is comparatively recent and is informed by the extension of norms associated with human rights. From the 1970s to the 1990s debates on human rights in Latin America were infused by a call for state actors rein in systematic abuses of citizen rights.⁸ The narratives were highly antagonistic, and understandably so. Over the last decade, the discussion has turned to identifying ways in which (national and subnational) public policy failures can be redressed through a more concerted focus on citizen, rather than state, security. This is justified on the grounds that states have the ultimate obligation to protect their citizens. Yet across Latin America - in disadvantaged urban and rural areas - there is perceptible absence of public institutions and interventions. A close inspection may also reveal a disproportionate state presence - and in particular military, police and penal institutions - that exacerbate, rather than prevent, violence. Supporters of citizen security, then, are especially committed to responsabilizing state institutions and promoting more responsive, inclusive and legitimate public policies that promote citizen safety and wellbeing.

The other central pillar of citizen security is the concept of *active citizenship*. There is a growing acceptance around the world, and not just in Latin America, that citizens play a fundamental role in ensuring their own security. On the one hand, citizens hold state officials to account for their failures to adequately guarantee security. On the other hand, the success of many public safety policies is predicated on positive engagement between police and the population. Although often confronted with a legacy of negligence and systematic mistreatment, finding ways of building engagement between the police and the population is widely regarded as essential in delivering information and sustaining effective policing policy. In the end citizens, in collaboration with police, must take ownership of their own security. This does not imply a support for vigilantism as is alarmingly common in some parts of Latin America⁹, but rather underlines the importance of citizens working together with police to ensure security in their work place,

⁶ See UNDP (2013) for a detailed description of the definition(s) of citizen security.


⁷ See Beatriz et al (2012).

⁸ See Sikkink (1996).

⁹ See Arias and Goldstein (2006).

neighborhoods, and homes. And citizen security seems to be catching-on. While variously defined, citizen security is fashionable across Latin America.¹⁰ Virtually every government in the region has established national, state and city plans, policies and programs advocating citizen security goals. Over the past decade countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have introduced legislative frameworks and new police and justice units to advance the cause. Regional organizations across the Americas have issued citizen security declarations and created commissions. Meanwhile, bilateral and multilateral entities have elevated citizen security as a new priority. Moreover, after years of advocating for transnational and national security priorities, the U.S. government now considers “citizen security” (and “civilian security”) as one of its four core priorities for Latin America.¹¹ Likewise, European Union members, Canada, Australia and Japan have inserted the term in their strategic aid agendas for the region. Among its chief proponents are also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, which have financed citizen security initiatives through grants and loans since the late 1990s.

Figure 1. Comparing different types of international cooperation for citizen security*



Source: Authors

**The size of the circle demonstrates the relative scale of assistance though their placement does not necessarily imply a direct linkage between them.*

10 See, for example, the recent UNDP (2013) and OAS (2012) reports on citizen security. See also the World Bank's new workstream on citizen security at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/EXTLACREGTOPSOCDEV/0,,contentMDK:23160739~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:847655,00.html>.

11 See US CRS (2013) and Muggah et al (2013). Also see the US State Department at <http://www.state.gov/j/>.

In spite of the apparent appetite for investing in citizen security, there is a surprising lack of clarity about what it is and what it is not. Predictably, there is even less clarity about who and how different actors are investing in its promotion.¹² At its most basic, international cooperation encompasses diverse activities and resources exchanged between actors according to their own interests and strategies. There is nothing intrinsically good or bad about international cooperation: it is a means to an end. Policy makers typically distinguish between *international cooperation for security* which is in the most part confined to discrete bilateral interactions and *international cooperation for development* which includes multilateral and bilateral assistance by a constellation of actors. International cooperation for security tends to be understood in relation to defense and police relationships, including those facilitated through international and regional bodies.¹³ Meanwhile, international cooperation for development relates to more traditional sectors of governance, education and health, livelihoods, and, increasingly, violence prevention and public safety.¹⁴ Yet even these generic categories are often contested owing to competing interpretations of “security” (e.g. common, collective, national, public, human, etc.) and “development” (e.g. sustainable, economic, human, etc.). These apparently semantic ambiguities can and do frustrate empirical measurement of the scale and direction of international cooperation, including in Latin America.¹⁵

The concept of international cooperation is regularly described in state-centric terms. That is, international cooperation has traditionally implied exchanges between, and for the benefit of, states. This has until quite recently been the norm in Latin America, where governments often underlined the “inter-state” features of international cooperation wary of interventionist agendas from foreign or domestic civil society interests. Today, there are some important distinctions between how countries in the region interpret international cooperation, particularly in relation to development. For example, some Latin American governments understand cooperation as limited only to exchanges that directly reinforce government functions. By contrast, others emphasize a more diverse array of interactions intended to benefit and strengthen both state and non-state actors.¹⁶ Among the former are Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela all of which interpret cooperation as a transaction between donor and recipient governments determined on the basis of state priorities and in accordance with state guidelines and procedures.¹⁷ In the latter camp are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay that tend to adopt a wider interpretation of cooperation that includes exchanges between donor states, recipient countries and their civil societies. The latter countries also advocate for direct financial and technical transfers alongside investments that address mutually determined concerns related to security and development.¹⁸

12 Consult pt.igarape.org.br/citizen-security-dialogues for a review of what works and what does not.

13 These may include, for example, defense agreements established via UNASUR, or police cooperation facilitated through Interpol, Europol or Ameripol.


14 There is of course a vast area of international cooperation for development. But the tendency to “securitize” development is increasingly evident, including in flagship publications of the IADB, UNDP, World Bank and others.

15 See Muggah and Augirre (2013) for a review of more than 1,300 citizen security interventions in Latin America since the late 1990s.

16 See Rodríguez and Vázquez (2010).

17 For a review of policies on international cooperation in these countries, see <http://www.cubaminrex.cu>, <http://www.cancilleria.gob.ni/>, http://www.gob.hn/portal/poder_ejecutivo/secretarias/seplan/, <http://mire.gob.pa/> and <http://www.mf.gov.ve/>.

18 For a review of policies on international cooperation in these countries, consult <http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/>, <http://www.planificacion.gob.bo/>, <http://www.abc.gov.br/>, <http://www.agci.cl/>, <http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/>, <http://www.rree.go.cr/?sec=ministerio&cat=cooperacion%20internacional>, <http://www.stp.gov.py/>, <http://www.segeplan.gob.gt/>, <http://dgctc.sre.gob.mx/>, and <http://www.mmrree.gob.ec/>, <http://www.apci.gob.pe/>, and <http://www.opp.gub.uy/>.

Figure 2. Citizen security interventions rising: 1998-2012 (n=1,304)

Source: Muggah and Aguirre (2013)

There are complex and diverse trends in international cooperation for citizen security in Latin America over the past decade. Generally, cooperation for counter-narcotics and the fight against organized crime increased in financial terms between 2000 and 2010 though appear to be stabilizing in some countries. Likewise, cooperation for citizen security priorities in monetary terms has generally remained steady, partly owing to the fact that a number of large Latin American countries “graduated” to middle income status.¹⁹ Meanwhile, investment in a wide variety of citizen security interventions is on the rise, especially over the past decade (see Figure 2). Notably, there appears to be a concentration of international cooperation for harder and softer dimensions of citizen security in specific geographic regions such as Central America and the Andean region as well as specific countries, notably Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Peru (see Figure 3).²⁰ Many governments are also displaying a willingness and commitment to cooperate on issues of citizen security. The veritable explosion of citizen security summits, conferences, and declarations over the past decade are testament to the growing political appetite of Latin American governments, though the concrete results of many of these efforts remain to be seen.

19 Interviews with policy makers associated with the EU, IADB and World Bank, December 2012 and January-March 2013.

20 Interviews with Nathalie Tatiana Alvarado (IADB), Robert Lipman (USJ OPDAT), and Alys Willman (World Bank).

Figure 3. Accounting for citizen security interventions in Latin America: 1998-2012 (n=1,304)

Source: Muggah and Aguirre (2013)

Of course, international cooperation for citizen security in Latin America cannot be reduced narrowly to bilateral exchanges between foreign donors and so-called aid recipients along “North-South” lines.²¹ Notwithstanding the considerable levels of financial assistance and equipment transferred by the United States and members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to Latin America, the region’s aid architecture is changing. Major economic players such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela are stepping-up their engagement in promoting citizen security priorities through material aid and transfers of expertise and intelligence.

21 According to UNDP (2011, total overseas development assistance (ODA) flows in 2009 from OECD countries amounted to \$120 billion. Aid from non-OECD countries totaled 6.6 billion. Cooperation from donors not reporting to the OECD was \$ 15.3 million. Bilateral assistance to multilaterals accounted for \$ 13.4 billion while philanthropic initiatives were \$52.6 billion and innovative finance mechanisms totaled 4 billion.

While still far from rivaling OECD countries, rising powers such as China, India, Russia, South Africa and Turkey are also steadily expanding their political and economic influence, albeit to a lesser extent on sensitive questions of security. Alongside bilateral actors are multilateral agencies such as the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), IADB, OAS, UNDP, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank that are involved in both financing local citizen security activities and facilitating cooperation across borders. Likewise, there are also a vast array of non-governmental organizations, private sector entities, research and academic institutions and foundations such as the Open Society Foundations (OSF) involved in all manner of international cooperation. Any serious accounting of international cooperation for citizen security in Latin America must recognize the increasing involvement of these actors and the ascendance of a “South-South” axis. Although distinguished in conceptual terms for the purposes of this *Strategic Paper*, bilateral, multilateral, regional, private and non-governmental, and south-south forms of cooperation for citizen security are overlapping and difficult to disentangle.

SECTION II

THE COMPLEX POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR CITIZEN SECURITY

Over the past two decades a number of countries in Central and South America witnessed a gradual but perceptible shift from hard transnational security priorities aligned with the priorities of North America and Western Europe to a citizen security agenda more explicitly defined by regional and domestic concerns. Not coincidentally, the *citizen security* concept emerged precisely as a number of Latin American countries consolidated their democratic transition after decades of military dictatorships and began to experience rapid economic growth. During the Cold War, more than three quarters of Latin American countries experienced a decade or more of authoritarian and military rule.²² The region passed through the “third wave” of democracy during the 1980s and 1990s giving rise to articulated civil society movements in most countries. And while Latin American societies are considered to be transitioning to democracy - or in some cases described as hybrid regimes²³ and in others as still at risk²⁴, it remains the case that the current period is one of unprecedented stability and prosperity. Indeed, many countries have made significant reductions in social and economic inequality and are in fact beginning to provide, rather than only receive, technical cooperation and official development assistance (ODA).

In the years preceding Latin America’s democratic transition, most countries in Central and South America advanced national security paradigms emphasizing the central role and involvement of military and policing institutions and the control of territorial borders. The primary threats were determined to be communism and socialism, with considerable security assistance provided by the United States. Indeed, some countries such as Cuba and Venezuela still emphasize the centrality of security institutions and territorial integrity, albeit in response to the perceived interventionism of the United States and its partners. Yet since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a small cadre of political leaders - many of them metropolitan authorities - began promoting security paradigms determined by priorities set from below. Effectively subverting traditional conceptions of national security, they called for more attention to ensuring the safety of citizens and addressing local threats rather than transnational risks to “states”.²⁵ In practical terms, state-and city-level officials together with civil society partners invested in policies and programs that privileged the rights and dignity of individuals and communities, especially those living in poorer and marginal areas. Described alternately as “citizen” or “democratic” security, their goal was to promote more state accountability and citizen participation in security governance.²⁶ Civic leaders from Bogota, Cali, Guatemala, Medellin, Mexico, Santiago de Chile, as well as Sao Paulo began stressing the fundamental place of “civic culture” (*cultura ciudadana*), “co-existence” (*convivencia*

22 Brazil, Chile and Paraguay, for instance, were ruled by multi-decade military regimes until the 1980s and 1990s.

23 The Economist Intelligence Unit determines that only Uruguay and Costa Rica are ranked as ‘full democracies’, with over 90 per cent of the region’s states ranking as ‘Authoritarian’, ‘Hybrid Regimes’, and ‘Flawed Democracies’. The EIU Index draws together on citizens’ perceptions of voter security, electoral fairness, government efficacy, and foreign influence.

24 See the Fragility Index ratings of “warning” for Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela.

25 Correspondence with Antanas Mokus, former mayor of Bogota, January 2013.

26 See IACHR (2009).

ciudadana), and access to justice as pillars of a new citizen security model.²⁷ And in a few select cases, their investments began showing results: interventions promoting local level safety coupled with measures promoting collective action²⁸ were shown in some cases to contribute to the prevention and reduction of violence.²⁹

Conceptually, then, citizen security constitutes the latest incarnation of the so-called security-development nexus.³⁰ It has echoes with analogous concepts developed in the 1990s such as human security. But citizen security is home-grown - grounded as it is in the historical and political realities of Latin America and the Caribbean. As with most progressive ideas, the concept did not immediately catch-on. For example, the international development banks were at first unsure how to engage the idea, conscious of the political ramifications among shareholders.³¹ Bilateral donors were likewise concerned about the way citizen security challenged their mandates and operational guidelines: typically, security cooperation was the preserve of defense and intelligence establishments while development cooperation was confined to non-political social and economic arms of the state and society. Notwithstanding these early anxieties, bilateral and multilateral partners gradually supported citizen security, in large part because of pressure from their Latin American counterparts.³²

The gradual expansion of international cooperation for citizen security over the past decade has also been shaped by the changing priorities of North American and Western European countries.³³ For example, the United States today invests in citizen security to promote security in the region, ensure that crime does not eventually spill across its own borders, and also to maintain a foothold in the security establishments of partners across the region.³⁴ It also envisions various types of citizen security cooperation with Latin America partners as a way of deterring the influence of other rivals, including China and Russia, which are deepening partnerships across the region.³⁵ Indeed, the United States has wound down much of its hard assistance while also increasing its commitment to citizen security - particularly the share of its assistance devoted to violence prevention and alternative development³⁶ - elevating it to one of the four core goals for the region. Even so, the overwhelming concentration of United States assistance continues to be devoted to containing transnational threats. And at the center of its strategy are *the Mérida Initiative*,

27 See Mockus et al (2012) and Mockus (2008).

28 Building on these initial experiences, more recent citizen security interventions have drawn extensively on notions of “collective efficacy” and the promotion of “social control enacted under conditions of social trust”. See Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) and Sampson et al (2002).

29 See, for example, Cerda et al (2008) which focuses on research in Medellín on the relationships between collective efficacy, homicide rates and individual perceptions of crime. For more evidence on what works in citizen security, consult also IADB (2012, 2011), Chaux (2012), World Bank (2011), Chiado et al (2011), FLACSO (2007), and Beato et al (2005).

30 See EU (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, and 2012e).

31 Communication with Nathalie Alvarado, January 2013.

32 Ibid. Also, communication with UNDP personnel in Panama (January 2013), as well as Antanas Mokus, January 2013 and Gustavo Petro, March 2013.

33 See Ickner (2007).


34 Some observers in Central America and the Andean region note that the United States has in some ways “privatized” the intelligence units of selected countries in the region.

35 See Bulle (2011).

36 According to Bulle (2011: 2): “... there has been an increase in the share of US assistance going to social and economic programs, as opposed to police and military assistance. While police and military assistance made up approximately half the total aid up to the early 2000s, it had decreased to approximately one-third by 2010.”

the *Central America Regional Security Initiative* (CARSI), *Plan Colombia*, and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) - re-named the *Andean Counterdrug Program* (ACP), all of which are treated below.

Figure 4. Spending on United States flagship security cooperation versus all other citizen security interventions (1998-2012)*



Source: Muggah and Aguirre (2013)


*The category of citizen security interventions includes more than 1,300 separate interventions from across Latin America categorized by the Igarapé Institute

Alongside the United States, Canada and a selection of European Union countries are also invested in providing hard and softer cooperation to promote citizen security. On the one hand, cooperation may narrowly involve budget support for governments or the funding of international agencies. On the other, it frequently entails technical assistance and training for Latin American police in investigation and forensics, the provision of customs and border control equipment, support for the reform of penal codes as countries move to accusatory systems, training of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys, and investments in data collection systems, youth-at-risk programs, and awareness campaigns. And while preoccupied with hard security priorities such as the flow of drugs to North America or Western Europe and Russia, many of these same governments are balancing their citizen security portfolios toward softer preventive strategies at the sub-regional and local levels. For example, the European Union explicitly favors efforts that may enhance regional integration, promote sharing of expertise between policing, justice and other civilian institutions, and strategies that deal with socio-economic risks that give rise to crime and violence.³⁷ Notwithstanding their charting an alternate course to the United States, their total overall assistance to Latin America

37 See EU (2012a, 2012b, 2009a, 2009b, 2008, and 2007).

is still comparatively modest when set against United States-led disbursements toward counter-narcotics and the fight against organized crime (Figure 4).³⁸

Figure 5. Relative scope and scale of international cooperation for citizen security in Latin America*



Source: Authors

**This figure is based on a general review of over 1,300 citizen security interventions launched between 1998-2012 and examines the general financial value accorded to each area.*

Even so, it is important to stress that overall North-South cooperation in Latin America, even when accounting for spending on citizen security, is in decline. This is at least partly because of a general fall in support to security cooperation from the United States. It is also because with the exception of some poorer South and Central American countries, most Latin American states have graduated to middle income status. There is no Latin American country in the OECD's list of recipients in the latest year classified as a "least developed country" or other "low income country".³⁹ As a result, the European Union is recalibrating its cooperation from 2014 to 2020 and emphasizing more political and economic exchanges, while simultaneously reducing its physical presence across the region.⁴⁰ What is more, bilateral donors such as Canada, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom are re-focusing citizen security priorities to especially fragile and low-income settings and focusing on priorities where they have a demonstrated

38 The total OECD DAC contributions of development assistance averaged roughly \$7 billion between 2008-2010 (and 10.8 billion in 2010), with the United States, Spain, Germany, Canada, France, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the top ten in overall spending.

39 It is worth noting, however, that El Salvador was considered the fourth most heavily aid-dependent country in the world over the past few years. See http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_SustainingMDGProgress_Ch5.pdf, page 157.

40 See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/43540882.pdf>.

comparative advantage.⁴¹ Meanwhile, multilateral agencies including the IADB, United Nations and World Bank are also reorganizing their approaches, notwithstanding a demonstrated commitment to maintaining support for citizen security.

Crucially, there is also a parallel expansion in international cooperation for citizen security within and between Latin American states. Countries across the region are actively investing in new ways of collaborating and partnering. In some cases, these instances of regional cooperation are subsidized by international donors.⁴² Some of this assistance is also being combined with local resources in order to multiply citizen security efforts across the region. For example, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico have expanded their provision of policing, judicial and intelligence assistance to specific neighbors and each other. Colombia's President Santos noted how "the experience that we have had dismantling ... cartels, training intelligence officers, and training judicial police can benefit the neighborhood". With trilateral support from the United States, the country has trained more than 10,000 police in forensics and special operations since 2009⁴³, including some 7,000 in Mexico.⁴⁴ Other examples include Brazil's increased investment in counter-narcotics and border control assistance with neighboring countries such as Bolivia and Peru, in some cases also with triangular support from the United States.⁴⁵ As intriguing as these examples are, they are only recently beginning to proliferate. Some critics argue that they constitute a proxy for United States agendas.⁴⁶ Part of the reason for their comparatively slow expansion can be attributed to the limitations of Latin America's greater regional project and continued mistrust between countries.

41 Moreover, no Latin American country figures in the top 20 recipients of ODA. See http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_SustainingMDGProgress_Ch5.pdf, page 157.

42 Specifically, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador were the top recipients of official development aid in 2010, the latest year for which complete data is available.

43 According to Brownfied (2012) "Since 2009, the Colombian National Police (CNP), our closest partner in promoting citizen security throughout the region, has trained some 10,000 police from across Latin America in areas such as criminal investigation skills, personal protection, and anti-kidnapping among other critical law enforcement disciplines".

44 See Forero (2011). Also based on author interviews with the head of the international cooperation section of the Federal Police of Colombia, February 2013.

45 See Muggah (2013).

46 Communication with Anne Tickner, March 2013.

SECTION III

CITIZEN SECURITY COOPERATION TO MITIGATE TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

The vast majority of international cooperation for citizen security is directed toward countering so-called transnational threats related to drugs production, trafficking, and generalized organized crime. By far the most significant area of cooperation in Latin America is related to countering so-called drug trafficking organizations, though other top-down modalities also exist for addressing so-called transnational gangs, the illegal arms trade, human smuggling, money laundering, and cyber-crime. Most concrete cooperation related to these threats consists of discrete bilateral exchanges between donor and recipient governments while in other cases it is conducted through other channels of regional cooperation including diplomatic and political forums, associations of military officials, police and judicial platforms, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and border and customs unions. Examples of the former include United States-supported programs in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and Colombia together with discrete assistance provided by United States Southern Command to military counterparts.⁴⁷ Examples of the latter include the creation of police commissions such as Ameripol, information collection and dissemination facilities organized through regional organizations, and agreements on issues of extradition or precursor chemicals under the auspices of regional mechanisms such as the OAS and SICA⁴⁸ and to a lesser extent CAN, Mercosur, and UNASUR.

Cooperation for counter-narcotics and organized crime

After years of providing military, policing and intelligence support to certain drug producer and transit countries in Latin America, the United States is only now entertaining a more balanced approach to addressing counter-narcotics and organized crime. The 2011 *Transnational Organized Crime Strategy* hints at how the United States is rethinking its strategy to contend with drug trafficking organizations, refocusing on criminal and terrorist groups, and addressing states that support and sanction organized crime.⁴⁹ Ultimately, United States-led cooperation in Latin America plays a pivotal role in shaping the regional (and indeed the global) approach to drug policy.⁵⁰ Yet it is important to recall that while financial and technical support has been extensive, it is in fact highly concentrated in a small number of Andean countries, Central America and Mexico. Predictably, support is conditioned not exclusively by foreign policy

47 See CRS (2011).

48 For example, the OAS has created the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and the Inter-American Observatory on Drugs (OID) as well as the Working Group for Preparing a Regional Strategy to Promote Inter-American Cooperation in Dealing with Criminal Gangs. Likewise, the SICA has supported a number of working groups to study cooperation on issues of border control and measures to combat arms trafficking. See <http://www.sica.int/>.

49 See Farah (2012).

50 Alongside this preoccupation with narcotics has been a deep antipathy to anti-democratic movements, concern with illegal migration and expansion of market access that has generated profound implications for how Latin American countries pursued their own domestic security.

considerations, but also by domestic interests and lobbies.⁵¹ To put its aid in perspective, roughly 80 per cent of all United States political and military assistance to Latin America is devoted to counter-narcotics: but the vast majority of this is directed toward domestic military and intelligence services and private contractors.⁵² Between 1980 and 2008 anti-drug assistance to Latin America amounted to more than \$10 billion and has remain steady, in some cases even declining, over the past five years (see Figures below).⁵³ This is almost equivalent to all official development aid spent in the region by all OECD donors combined (minus the United States) over the same period.⁵⁴

One of the most significant international cooperation modalities for the fight against transnational crime administered by the United States is the *Andean Counterdrug Program* (ACP).⁵⁵ Since 2000, the program was the primary means of cooperation between the United States and Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. While the ACP itself featured no unified or over-arching strategy - country strategies are elaborated on a case-by-case basis - it nevertheless provided material support for supply reduction. Since its inception, the United States Congress channeled at least \$5 billion dollars toward “counter-narcotics, democratic institution building, and development assistance”, with some three quarters directed exclusively to Colombia.⁵⁶ Interventions included activities to reduce cocaine cultivation, production and trafficking as well as to detect and interdict the movement of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals, traffickers and illegal funds.⁵⁷ In 2010 the United States shifted ACP resources back to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE) with evidence of clear reductions in requested and actual spending between 2010 and 2012 (see Figure 6). Alongside these programs, the United States *Department of Defense Counter-Narcotics Assistance* program also supports interventions in Andean countries and across Central and the rest of South America.⁵⁸

51 On the one hand, the country has experienced a significant political polarization between liberal and conservative movements, particularly in relation to social, health and economic issues. This has shaped a hard line internationally on eradicating drug production and reducing trafficking. Yet this is occurring despite extensive movement on cannabis: it is legalized for recreational use in two states, decriminalized in fifteen others, and regulated for medical use in 20 states and the district of Columbia.. Curiously, when asked in Gallup polls “what is the most important challenge facing the United States”, roughly 0.5 per cent cite drugs.

52 See Farah (2011).

53 The United States federal government spends roughly \$ 25 billion each year on drug control, about 90 per cent of which is spent within the country (with most funds provided to law enforcement and treatment). International expenditures amount for roughly 8 per cent, or \$ 2 billion per year, of federal spending or 3-4 per cent of total spending. See Hakim (2012) and US Congressional Research Service (2012). See also http://justf.org/All_Grants_Country.


54 According to the OECD-DAC (2012) the total amount spent between 1980-2010 was roughly \$ 17 billion.

55 Before 2008, the ACP was known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, or ACI.

56 Of this amount, some \$ 366 million was allocated to Bolivia (7 per cent), \$ 3.9 billion to Colombia (76 per cent), \$233 million to Ecuador (5 per cent), \$659 million for Peru ((13 per cent) and \$ 7 million to Venezuela (less than 1 per cent).

57 See United States Government Accountability Office (2012).

58 The Department of Defense support to Colombia, in particular, including in relation to demobilization programs, military and police modernization and humanitarian aid amounted to \$ 1.1 billion between 2002 and 2009. See US Congressional Research Service (2012).

Figure 6. US international cooperation for Plan Colombia (\$ million): 2000-2012

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ACI/ACP/INCLE	892	48	378	580	474	463	465	465	245	230	244	204	161
DOD	229	190	117	165	178	155	140	129	129	128	129	110	98
Other	38	38	63	63	143	151	136	129	326	312	277	243	230
Total	1148	276	560	808	795	769	741	723	700	670	650	557*	489*

Other includes: economic support funds⁵⁹, foreign military financing; international military education and training; international narcotics control and law enforcement; and anti-terrorism, demining and other activities.

Source: Compiled from US Department of State (2012) and US Congressional Research Service (2012)

Meanwhile, *Plan Colombia*⁶⁰ was crafted together with the Colombian authorities in 1999 and approved by the United States government in 2000 as a comprehensive six-year strategy. Its goals were ambitious: to end a decades-long conflict, eradicate drug production and trafficking, foster social and economic development and promote democracy.

59 The increase from 2010-2012 was largely for so-called economic support.

60 The full name is Plan para la Paz, la Prosperidad, y el Fortalecimiento del Estado. See http://www.usip.org/files/plan_colombia_101999.pdf.



Brazilian security forces are stepping up their monitoring of the border between Brazil and Colombia.

PHOTO: MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA

Wary of the United States' past interventions in Latin America, the *Plan* was initially cast as a "counter-narcotics" package rather than a "counter-insurgency" strategy.⁶¹ The United States and Colombian governments expanded the program following September 11 2001, enhancing the direct involvement of its South Command military force.⁶² Following the election of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, *Plan Colombia* was revised and recast as the *Democratic Security* strategy which more explicitly fused counter-narcotics with counter-insurgency.⁶³ A stated objective of the cooperation was to eliminate the "narco-terrorist" threat - including through the demobilization of more than 30,000 paramilitaries and guerrillas - as well as the eradication of drug production and trafficking to weaken insurgent capabilities.⁶⁴ United States spending on *Plan Colombia* and *Democratic Security* amounted to almost \$9 billion between 2000-2012 (of which \$6.7 billion was devoted to military and policing personnel and equipment)⁶⁵ with most funds devoted to ACI/ACP/INCLE (counter-narcotics) activities and the department of defense or DOD (see Figure 7).⁶⁶

61 It is worth recalling that as early as 1998 the United States Department of Defense had already supported the creation of a new counter-narcotics battalion within the Colombian armed forces. The latter's mission was to guarantee security conditions for anti-drug campaigns, including fumigation programs. It was under the stewardship of former Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey and State Department official Thomas Pickering that a wider strategy of Plan Colombia was elaborated from 1999 onward. The plan initially amounted to \$ 7.5 billion, of which US\$ 3.5 billion was to be provided by the "international community" and US\$ 4 billion from the Colombian state.


62 See <http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/US-Military-Support-to-Colombia.aspx>.

63 See Acevedo et al (2008).

64 See between 1999 and 2005, 57 per cent of the resources of Plan Colombia were allocated to the strengthening of Colombian security forces and the eradication of coca leaf plantations; 27 per cent to the strengthening of democratic institutions; with only 16 per cent set aside for economic and social revitalization. See Acevedo et al (2008).

65 Communication with Adam Isacson, December 2012.

66 See US Congressional Research Service (2012).

Figure 7. US international cooperation for Mérida (\$ millions): 2008-2012

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Bridge	0	48	0	0	0
Amount	0	300	210	143	0
Supplement	352	420	175	0	0
Requested	0	0	0	0	281.8
Total	352	768	385	143	281.8

Source: Compiled from US Department of State (2012b)

The *Mérida Initiative* was a recent international cooperation agreement established between Mexico and the United States and originally intended to last from 2008 to 2010. In acknowledging a “shared responsibility” for countering drug supply and demand, the Mérida Initiative supported hard counter-narcotics campaigns in Mexican border areas adjacent to the United States and Guatemala. Although originally intended to also include assistance to Central America, the vast majority of assistance was channeled to Mexico. It is worth recalling that Mérida was preceded by modest bilateral cooperation, including United States assistance to the *Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales*

(GAFE) of the Mexican armed forces in the 1990s.⁶⁷ Notwithstanding persistent concerns by Mexico with United States interference in sovereign affairs, the Mérida Initiative witnessed a marked increase in Department of Defense support between 2009 and 2012 with investments of over \$280 million.⁶⁸ At its center was a concerted campaign against cartels and drug trafficking groups together with the strengthening of territorial, air and maritime border control capacities, reforming of the justice sector to an adversarial system, the centralization of the country's 2,800 police forces, and demand reduction efforts.⁶⁹ Although there are disagreements about total spending, according to the U.S. government between 2008 and 2010 the *Mérida Initiative* totaled some \$2.4 billion of which \$1.7 billion was invested in military and policing assistance.⁷⁰ *Mérida* was extended in 2010, with new program shifting from a focus on the acquisition of Blackhawk helicopters and other equipment to a more concerted focus on institutional reform of police, justice and prison sectors in the country.⁷¹

Finally, the *CARSI* program represents an extension of the Mérida Initiative to include cooperation with Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Launched in 2008, CARSI was expanded in 2010. And while supported primarily by the United States, it also features a wider array of bilateral and multilateral partners. Highlighting the importance of “citizen safety”⁷², the United States emphasizes military, police and justice training and equipment and counter-narcotics support, but also investments to strengthen the “capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges ... and the underlying economic and social conditions that leave communities vulnerable to these threats”.⁷³ At the center of CARSI is a drive to promote citizen security, to disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within Central America, support for public sector reform and strategic planning, the promotion of community policing, and improved coordination and intelligence cooperation between countries and partners to combat regional security threats.⁷⁴ More than \$496 million has been spent since its inception, though projections take it to \$574 million in 2013 (see Figure 8).

67 Following the events of September 11 2001, the United States also financed enhanced border security programs as well as more engagement against Mexican cartels, particularly the Sinaloa and Zeta groups. After meetings between then President Bush and former President Calderón in 2007, a major package of military helicopters, aircraft, scanning equipment and security forces training was introduced.

68 See US Congressional Research Service (2012b).

69 Other Mexican agencies receiving assistance include PGR, CISEN and INAMI, as well as border police in a number of key states.


70 It is worth noting that human rights conditions were attached to assistance. See US Congressional Research Service (2012b).

71 The latest iteration of the initiative focuses on disrupting criminal organization capacities, strengthening public institutions responsible for combating crime in full observance of the rule of law, human rights and civil society participation, developing stronger border control, and building resilient communities to address the “root causes of crime and violence ... and offering constructive, legal alternatives for the development of young people”. See US Department of State (2010). Interviews with United States State Department, January 2013.

72 See <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/carsi/>.

73 See United States Congressional Research Service (2012c).

74 CARSI does not focus explicitly on gangs but rather “violence and drugs”. Even so, CARSI programs tend to overlap with those supported by INCLE and USAID. See United States Congressional Research Service (2012d).

Figure 8. CARSI budget in \$ millions (2008-2012)⁷⁵

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	TOTAL
						Request	
ESF	25	18	23	30	45	47.5	188.5
INCLE	24.8	70	65	71.5	60	60	351.3
NADR	6.2	---	----	----	---		6.2
FMF	4	17	7	----	---		28
Total	60	105	95	101.5	105	107.5	574

Source: United States Congressional Research Service (2012a, b, c, d)

In the wake of these and other forms of international cooperation, Latin America has recently emerged at the epicenter of the contemporary debate on drug policy. For the first time since the establishment of the 1961 *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, countries across the region are debating the merits of international cooperation to address

⁷⁵ ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing.

transnational security threats and exploring alternative policies and programs better suited to their particular domestic requirements. Initially driven forward by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, itself succeeded by the Global Commission on Drug Policy, political, business and cultural elites are questioning whether the existing international drug control regime and its emphasis on criminalizing drug production, supply and use is generating positive results in the Latin American neighborhood. Mounting evidence shows that conventional approaches are not only unable to curtail the harvest, sale and consumption of illicit drugs, but also generate extensive human costs in terms of public health and, equally significantly, citizen security.⁷⁶ The enforcement of counter-narcotics and anti-organized crime initiatives described above are associated with contradictory outcomes in terms of overall drug supply reduction and a definitive worsening of violence, the corruption of state institutions, expanding prison populations and the systemic erosion of human rights.

Unprecedented political and legal transformations with respect to citizen security cooperation are occurring in and between countries across the region. For example, Latin American leaders raised the issue of alternative approaches to drug policy at the 2012 OAS-sponsored *Summit of the Americas* in Cartagena. Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico also issued a joint declaration at the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2012 requesting that the United Nations “exercise its leadership and conduct deep reflection to analyze all available options” in relation to drug policy and citizen security promotion.⁷⁷ Another major development occurred in mid-2013 with the presentation of a much anticipated report of the OAS on future drug scenarios. The Secretary General of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, presented a copy of the findings to Colombian President Santos outlining alternative scenarios for drug control and regulation across the Americas. Meanwhile, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico are rethinking approaches and exploring drug control policies oriented toward the well-being and safety of their populations. In December 2013, Uruguay became the first country ever to regulate cannabis for adult recreational use. Civil society groups across the region are agitating for change, pushing conservative governments into taking action. At the same time, there has been an unprecedented evolution in drug policy in several states in the United States, resulting in it now being in contravention to the international drug control regime.⁷⁸ Although the President of the United States acknowledged the failure of drug policy and quietly dropped the “war on drugs” expression in 2012⁷⁹, it seems that actual priorities in terms of resource flows are slower to change.⁸⁰ During the past five years there has only been a decrease in overall United States military and police aid to Latin America and a similarly limited increase in social and economic components of counter-narcotics.⁸¹

And while there are signs of a shift in the United States’ approach to counter-narcotics and the fight against organized crime, old habits die hard. For a century or more, Latin America’s security priorities have been heavily influenced by its North American neighbor. An enduring preoccupation with countering drugs, ensuring border security, maximizing

76 See Global Commission (2012, 2011).

77 See <http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/3332-joint-declaration-of-colombia-guatemala-and-mexico-demanding-un-revision-on-drug-policy.html>.

78 Indeed, domestic reforms, including the legalization of medical marijuana by 19 states, decriminalization by 12 states and the legalization of recreational use by adults in 2 states, present a real challenge to the international regime.

79 See US (2012) and Walsh (2012).

80 See Hakim (2011).

81 See http://justf.org/All_Grants_Country?funding=Counter-Narcotics+Programs.

economic influence and appeasing domestic constituencies has shaped the United States posture in relation to Mexico, Central and South America. It adopted progressively more militarized forms of cooperation in Latin America including in relation to reducing cocaine cultivation and refinement (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) and preventing transportation, retail and consumption (in particular Mexico and Brazil, but increasingly the countries of Central America).⁸² For the past fifty years, but particularly since President Nixon declared drugs as “America’s public enemy number one” in the early 1970s, the illicit drug market was conceived as a threat to national security (Nixon 1971). Since then, the United States Department of Defense⁸³, the State Department⁸⁴, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the United States Aid Agency (USAID) and others have worked in concert with partners across the region to wage a war on drugs.

Cooperation to fight organized crime

Alongside major counter-narcotics initiatives, Latin American governments have also stepped up action against organized crime, including transnational gangs, over the past decade. For its part, the United States expanded international cooperation on anti-gang activities following September 11 2001 effectively bundling the threats presented by gangs together with risks arising from insurgent and terrorist groups.⁸⁵ In 2004, the FBI created a task force to address gangs while in 2005 the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security created a national anti-gang initiative called *Operation Community Shield*, working closely with Latin American counterparts.⁸⁶ By 2007, an inter-agency committee developed a US *Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico*.⁸⁷ And by 2010, the United States claimed to have cracked down on members of *mara* and *pandilla* groups in the United States, most of who were ultimately deported back from cities such as Los Angeles to Central America.⁸⁸ Between 2008 and 2012 the United States Congress mandated some \$35 million through the INCLE for anti-gang activities, though considerably more funding was earmarked in both the Mérida and CARSI programs.⁸⁹

82 Bolivia, Colombia and Peru are singled out as the suppliers of cocaine and opiates while Mexico and Central America are regarded as a corridor for upward 95 per cent of cocaine entering the United States. See US Congressional Research Service (2012).

83 Principally through the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD-CN>) for the Andean region.

84 The State Department funds security assistance programs, in most cases implemented by the Department of Defense, including the Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training programs. It also supports the Department of Homeland Security to implement counter-narcotics support which in turn supports Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the US coast guard, as well as the Department of Justice International Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP).

85 See CRS (2011).

86 The FBI created a special task force focusing on Central American gangs, and announced the creation of a liaison office in El Salvador to coordinate regional information sharing and anti-gang efforts.

87 This was followed up by a GAO recommendation to strengthen anti-gang strategies by designated certain groups - including MS-13 - a transnational criminal organization.

88 The United States claimed to have deported 3,332 alleged MS-13 gang members in United States cities between 2005 and 2010, most of whom were deported.

89 See US Department of State (2012).

It is worth noting that the United States has unintentionally contributed to the growth of transnational gangs. Indeed, the country has for decades been deporting illegal migrants and convicted felons from Latin America and the Caribbean back to their countries' of origin.⁹⁰ As a result, the children of many asylum seekers and refugee claimants from Central America living in Los Angeles, New York and Miami have been sent back to their parents' city of origin. For example, in 2010 more than 195,000 Mexicans with criminal records were deported back to Mexico.⁹¹ Some 130,000 Central Americans were also sent to the eight countries in the sub-region between 2001 and 2010.⁹² Significantly, the United States reported that 9,497 Honduras were deported between 1992 and 1996 and another 106,826 from 1998 to 2004.⁹³ Likewise, between 1998-2004, there were 64,312 citizens with criminal records deported to Guatemala, 87,031 to El Salvador, and 7,743 to Nicaragua. Indeed, the rate of deportations to Central America appears to have increased overall from the 1990s to the present, coinciding with a dramatic deterioration in citizen security across the sub-region.



The MS-13 are a powerful gang with operations in El Salvador.

PHOTO: THE GANGS OF THE WORLD

More recently, Latin American countries and foreign partners have broadened their strategy for dealing with gangs and consciously emphasized regional solutions. For example, there has been an effort to engage SICA in the development of comprehensive approaches over the past five years, with some governments such as the United States, Canada and Germany also simultaneously promoting preventive programs and reinsertion projects to address ex-gang members and at-risk youth.⁹⁴ For its part, the SICA strategy calls for investments in support for repatriated Latin Americans, improvements in law enforcement, and prevention to deal with gangs in Central America.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the OAS also convened meetings on the issue of gang violence, passing a resolution in 2007 that called for more hemispheric cooperation. In 2008 the OAS Permanent Council held a special session on transnational gangs and created a working

90 See Passel and Cohen (2011) and Chávez et al (2011).

91 See Universal (2011).

92 See Dudley (2012).

93 See Chávez et al (2011).

94 See for example the collaboration between SICA and Inter-Peace since 2009 at <http://www.interpeace.org/2011-08-08-15-19-20/latest-news/2009/75-sica-signs-mou-with-interpeace-to-strengthen-capacities-of-member-states-to-confront-youth-violence> or the joint USAID-SICA strategy called the gang prevention alliance at http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/CAIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIStaff/DashBoard_CAIIAdminDatabase/CAIAdminProjectDetails.aspx?PageName=Central-America-Regional-Youth-Alliance-USAID-SICA&PDDSurveyID=1340.

95 See <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/93586.htm>.

group to set out an inter-American cooperation strategy to deal with “criminal gangs”.⁹⁶ Yet, while the United States, the European Union and other donor countries have demonstrated a willingness to shore-up these efforts⁹⁷, concerns about the real capacities of regional institutions to practically implement strategies remain. Following a major United States-led assessment of gangs in Central America and Mexico in 2006, bilateral and multilateral agencies have also expanded cooperation with national counterparts to promote prevention and rehabilitation programs, community policing support and *ad hoc* arrangements focused on reinsertion and rehabilitation efforts for at-risk and actual gang members at the municipal level.⁹⁸ For example, USAID supported the development of a rash of programs with governments in Central America to address chronic youth unemployment, the promotion of educational opportunities and strategies to deal with inter-familial and intimate partner violence. Another focus has been on promoting crime prevention at the municipal level, supporting safe spaces for youth, establishing outreach centers, strengthening juvenile justice systems, and citizen action through diagnostics and outreach.⁹⁹ A growing number of public and private partners of the United States, together with United Nations agencies, have also initiated regional and national programs and projects to reinsert at risk youth and gang members in the wake of peace pacts (El Salvador) or following release from prison.¹⁰⁰

It is worth recalling that this recent iteration of international cooperation is in stark contrast to more than a decade of *mano dura* anti-gang measures adopted by countries across the region. Specifically, aggressive measures to counter gangs were implemented in Honduras (e.g. *Cero Tolerancia*), Guatemala (*Plan Escoba*) and Nicaragua from late 2003 onwards. Repressive in character, *mano dura* (and subsequently *super mano dura*) merged military and police responses and advocated draconian penalties for real and suspected gang members.¹⁰¹ Over time, they led to the arrest and in some cases arbitrary imprisonment of tens of thousands of young men and contributed to dramatic increases in prison populations.¹⁰² The clustering of inmates in jails and prisons contributed in turn to the deepening of gang linkages across the region and an intensification of violence until the initiation of a gang truce in 2012. Wary of the ways in which these strategies potentially intensified, rather than alleviated, citizen insecurity, international partners applied pressure for a change in approach. For their part, Central American countries internationalized

96 See <http://www.oas.org/csh/english/Dealing%20with%20Gangs.asp> for progress on the regional strategy. See also http://www.oas.org/dsp/English/cpo_pandillas.asp for background documents.

97 Specialized interventions tend to be couched as ‘regional’ or ‘triangular’ cooperation. For example, there is a treaty process that allows DEA agents to share info on gun and bullet tracing (i.e. eTrace). Moreover, there are technical assistance programs that allow for the placement of personnel in places like Guatemala, El Salvador, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. In Central America, US-led policy responses are generally securitized and range from an extension of the Mérida to the Central American Intelligence Program (CAIP) throughout countries in Central America, to Community Shield and Safer-community strategies in major United States cities such as Los Angeles.

98 See USAID (2006) at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG834.pdf.

99 According to USAID, “a total of 11 Outreach Centers have been established in El Salvador and Honduras: 6 in El Salvador, 5 in Honduras. USAID expects to establish 12 additional Centers in El Salvador and 20 additional Centers in Honduras for a total of 43 Outreach Centers”. See, for example, <http://elsalvador.usaid.gov/noticias.php?noticia=182&filtrar=5&idi=en>.

100 See Muggah et al (2012) for a review of gang truces in the Americas.

101 In September 2003, a regional summit of heads of state in Central America declared that (transnational) gangs were ‘a destabilizing menace, more immediate than any conventional war or guerrilla’. By early 2004, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua agreed to lift legal barriers to the cross-country prosecution of gang members, whatever their nationality. And in mid-2005, the presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala decided to establish a joint security force to patrol gang activity along their common border.

102 See Jutersonke et al (2009) and Cruz (2007).

cooperation through enhanced engagement with the United States.¹⁰³ In addition to initiatives noted above, this has also included training and technical assistance is also provided to dedicated police officials throughout Central America through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador, the only such institution in the Americas.

Cooperation for preventing illicit arms transfers

Many Latin American countries have also called for intensified cooperation on transnational challenges such as illegal small arms and light weapons proliferation, availability and misuse.¹⁰⁴ The UNODC estimates that easy access to firearms is a major factor shaping homicidal violence in the region: gun-related homicide rates exceed the global average in 2010 by more than 30 per cent.¹⁰⁵ Yet efforts to develop effective regional strategies have been fragmented. On the one hand, issues of arms and ammunition production, stocks and trade are still highly sensitive in a region where military and police holdings are considered state secrets. Likewise, certain countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are expanding their defense sector - including the exports of firearms and ammunition - adding an additional layer of complexity to regulatory efforts. As a result, international cooperation on issues of small arms proliferation tends to be tightly calibrated to both political and economic considerations. Complicating matters, some countries may not always exert a positive influence on arms control and disarmament measures. While providing bilateral assistance to some countries to address illicit flows and surplus stocks, the United States has also stalled and weakened global and regional efforts¹⁰⁶ and has patently failed to stem the flow of illicit arms across its own borders into Mexico.¹⁰⁷

One of the primary international cooperation vehicles for regulating the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons is the United Nations. Yet Latin American states have a mixed record in terms of advancing meaningful arms control and implementing key provisions. For example, the *United Nations Firearms Protocol*, the only legally binding instrument designed to regulate the illicit manufacture and trade of weapons, was ratified by just eight countries in Latin America after its emergence in 2001.¹⁰⁸ Likewise, with some exceptions, countries across the region were marginal participants in the United Nations *Program of Action* since its launch in 2001¹⁰⁹, another process intended to address all aspects of illicit small arms production and trafficking. Moreover, a mere two thirds of Latin American countries have established focal points to coordinate regional and domestic action. And while most states in Latin America have established import laws and procedures, few have created controls over arms brokers or conduct routine reviews over excess stocks and surplus, a key source of the diversion and subsequent trafficking of illegal

103 Central American states also sought to involve the United States, which, though initially reluctant unfounded allegations connecting gangs to 'terrorist groups' such as Al-Qaeda and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2004 and 2005.

104 See UNODC (2012) and Karp (2009).

105 See Sweigh (2013).

106 See <http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/290001-senate-votes-to-stop-us-from-joining-un-arms-treaty>.

107 See McDougall et al (2013) at <http://www.theatlantic.com/topher-mcdougall-robert-muggah-david-shirk-and-john-patterson/>.

108 The UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), was adopted in 2001 by the GA with resolution 55/255 and entered into force on 3 June 2005. The Firearms Protocol constitutes, to date, the only global legally-binding instrument addressing the issue of small arms.

109 The full name is United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.



The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was once involved in demobilizing Nicaraguan resistance forces operating out of Honduras.

UN PHOTO/STEEN JOHANSEN

weaponry. A major challenge is the lack of transparency and trust of countries in the region, a key impediment to progress across many corollary areas of citizen security.

Even so, there are still examples of regional and sub-regional cooperation to address the challenges associated with small arms and light weapons, including through arms control agreements and frameworks. One of the most significant achievements in the region was led by the OAS in 1997 and is known as the *Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Explosives and Other Related Materials* (CIFTA).¹¹⁰ CIFTA requires ratifying countries to create laws and to establish procedures for importing, exporting and tracing small arms, light weapons and ammunition as well as to apply mechanisms to ensure verification and enforcement. It was a seminal agreement at the time, the first international arms control agreement signed in the Americas. The agreement also enjoyed early support from the United States though the government failed to ratify it owing to domestic pressures.¹¹¹

CIFTA, alongside other model firearms regulations, sets out standards for marking and tracing arms and spurred on engagement at the sub-regional level. Shortly after agreement on CIFTA in 2005, SICA adopted a politically-binding code of conduct on arms, ammunition and explosives that prohibits signatories from transferring arms to rights-violating states.¹¹² Likewise, the Andean Community, CAN, adopted a plan to address arms trafficking, so-called

¹¹⁰ See <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/arms.htm>.

¹¹¹ A 2000 State Department fact sheet highlighted how “the United States was a leader in concluding” the treaty. “First proposed by Mexico and negotiated in just seven months,” it continued, “this agreement strengthens the ability of the OAS nations to eradicate illicit arms trafficking, while protecting the legal trade in firearms.” The United States claimed in 2002 that it was “modeled on U.S. laws, regulations, and practices.” The convention is “an outstanding example of the contribution that the OAS is making to the security of the hemisphere”.

¹¹² See OAS (2012) and also <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/arms.htm>.

Decision 552.¹¹³ MERCOSUR members also agreed to a *Joint Firearms Registration Mechanism* in 1998, though it has yet to be operationalized¹¹⁴, and only reluctantly established a working group to move ahead with CIFTA. Meanwhile, a number of Latin American countries unilaterally launched efforts to regulate, collect and destroy small arms and light weapons, at times with support from the United States¹¹⁵, agencies such as the United Nations regional center for peace, disarmament and development (UNLiREC), and UNDP.¹¹⁶ Over the past decade, the United States has also pressured countries to comply with arms control policy while initiating close collaboration through the Bureau for Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and others to enhance intelligence capabilities. Not all of these efforts have generated productive results: the so-called Fast and Furious program designed to track U.S. weapons in Mexico resulted in both tragedy and embarrassment.¹¹⁷

More positively, there was almost universal support across Latin America in support of a new *Arms Trade Treaty*. Passed by a vote of 154 to 3 (with abstentions from Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) in 2013 the Treaty sets out provisions and standards to regulate the import, export, and transfer of seven types of conventional weapons, as well as small arms and light weapons. Latin American countries were instrumental in advancing the process through the United Nations, with the idea first introduced by former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias in the late 1990s. The process is intended to build confidence in enhanced transparency, including the revitalization of the non-legally binding UN Register of Conventional Arms and the legally-binding OAS *Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions* mechanism which entered into force in 2001. While few Latin American countries report to either the Register or the *Convention*, suggesting a failure to comply with both legal and political commitments, they nevertheless represent a kind of confidence-building modalities.¹¹⁸ It is anticipated that the inclusion of a reporting function in a future legally-binding Treaty could enhance transparency in Latin America.¹¹⁹

Cooperation to reduce human trafficking

The issue of human trafficking - particularly for the purposes of prostitution, labor and child exploitation - is disturbingly widespread across Latin America, though weakly acknowledged. Latin American countries are source, transit and destination sites and the primary supplier of trafficked people to the United States, though there is also a clear grey area when it comes to voluntarily migrating populations. The United States recognizes the trafficking in persons as one of the most prolific areas of organized crime and as widespread and endemic in Latin America.¹²⁰

113 See <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D552e.htm>. Interview with CAN in Lima, April 2013.

114 See <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/3.aspx>.

115 Since 2001, the United States assisted at least four Latin American states to destroy surplus small arms and surface to air missiles as well as to improve stockpile security. In El Salvador, the United States assisted authorities destroy 30,000 small arms in 2003, in Honduras, 13,680 small arms and 5,772 unstable munitions were destroyed in 2006-07, in Nicaragua, 1,011 rockets were destroyed in 2004-06, and in Suriname, 3 million .50-cal rounds, 20,000 WWII-vintage rounds, and 20,000 small-arms munitions (including grenades) were destroyed in 2006-07. See Stohl and Tuttle (2006).

116 See UNLiREC (2012) for a review of its activities on firearms control.

117 See McDougall et al (2013).

118 See <http://www.coha.org/the-long-road-to-arms-trade-transparency-in-latin-america/>.

119 Countries such as Belize, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and others have also called for improved reporting practices as part of a future Treaty. Brazil and Cuba, however, are seeking to water down the Treaty.

120 See United States CRS (2013b).

Related crimes include fraud, extortion, racketeering, bribery, drug and arms trafficking, migrant trafficking kidnapping, document forgery, and money laundering. In 2000, the United States established the trafficking in victims protection act (TVPA)¹²¹ which in turn mandates a series of policies and task forces operating across borders. The State Department also issues annual progress reports on trafficking in persons separating countries into three tiers according to their compliance to basic norms and standards.¹²² It has also authorized more than \$17 million to anti-trafficking measures across Latin America in 2010 and increased such activities under the auspices of the Mérida Initiative and CARSI, discussed above.

A number of Latin American countries have stepped up their engagement on the issue, in some cases for fear of international pressure or the threat of sanctions from the United States. For example, most countries have signed and ratified key international protocols such as the *UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons*, the *ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor*, the *Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Pornography*, and the *Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict*. Many states have passed and amended anti-trafficking legislation, as well as introduced new coordinating offices, commissions and task forces to address the issue. A concern, however, has been that in spite of new reforms and initiatives, many governments claim to lack the resources to adequately resource prevention, investigation or victim assistance.¹²³ Indeed, traffickers are very rarely arrested or convicted, suggesting that political will and judicial capacities are weak and that there are insufficient incentives to motivate meaningful action.¹²⁴

And while widely recognized as a major challenge, Latin American countries have only taken incremental steps at the regional level to prevent and reduce human trafficking. The OAS drew attention to the scale of the issue in 1999, particularly amongst women and girls.¹²⁵ In 2003 and 2004, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the issue, including the creation of an OAS Coordinator on the Issue of Trafficking in Persons, itself based in the Inter-American Commission of Women, or CIM.¹²⁶ An Anti-Trafficking in Persons Unit was formed in 2005 with the intention of developing specialized training, information sharing and the exchange of good practice for member states having trained more than 550 officials and 350 United Nations peacekeepers. Likewise, the IADB has supported anti-trafficking efforts together with the OAS and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guyana and Paraguay, including with private foundations.¹²⁷ The IADB has also established trafficking prevention hotlines in Central America, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.

121 The TVPA was reauthorized through FY2011 in the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457).

122 In 2011, Cuba and Venezuela were ranked tier 3 while Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Panama were considered tier 2. See United States CRS (2011).

123 See <http://www.insightcrime.org/tag/Human-Trafficking> for a review of human trafficking measures in Latin America.

124 Public corruption is also routinely cited as an obstacle owing to complicity between traffickers and corrupt border officials, customs agents, law enforcement personnel and politicians. See CRS (2005).

125 This was due to a study by the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM) in nine Latin American countries.

126 For the past decade CIM has provided training and public awareness in Belize, Bolivia, Mexico and across the Caribbean, as well as destination countries in the European Union as well as Japan and the United States.

127 See United States CRS (2005).

Cooperation to prevent money laundering

Latin American countries have a long tradition of cooperating on issues of money laundering, including in relation to the fight against drug trafficking but also “terrorist” financing.¹²⁸ Specifically the 1988 *United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* draws attention to the role of money laundering and notes that signatories are “determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their pain incentive for doing so”. To this end, the United Nations General Assembly approved a political declaration and action plan against money laundering.¹²⁹ Additional treaties such as the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*¹³⁰ (1999), the *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*¹³¹ (2000) and the *United Nations against Corruption*¹³² (2003) also set out a normative framework for Latin America. But it is the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and related networks¹³³ as well as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which complete the global architecture for combating money laundering.¹³⁴

At the regional level, Latin American governments are cooperating through the OAS - particularly the CICAD Money Laundering Control Section - among others. For example, the Section has facilitated the drafting of model legislation¹³⁵, supported financial intelligence units across Central and South America, and training of judges, prosecutors and police investigators. Also critical is the OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) which sponsors exchanges across the region. The Financial Action Task Force of South America, or GAFISUD, founded as part of the *Buenos Aires Declaration of Money Laundering in 2005*, also includes ten members.¹³⁶ The OAS also supports a number of initiatives to train governments in seized and forfeited asset management, including the BIDL project¹³⁷ as well as cooperation with the IADB, the European Union and the World Bank.¹³⁸ Since 1998, the OAS and IADB collaborated on initiatives to conduct *juicios simulado*, improved judicial action, and the creation of financial intelligence units. Meanwhile, the OAS has also formed an Expert Group on the Control of Money Laundering¹³⁹ and supports pilot projects to promote good practice in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, and elsewhere. Countries such as

128 See Farah (2010).

129 See <http://www.imolin.org/imolin/ungadec.html>.

130 See <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>.

131 See <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>.

132 See <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html>.

133 For example the Egmond Group and International Money Laundering Information Network are regarded as key actors.

134 The UNODC has established legal assistance program for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAPLAC) which is active in Honduras and the Dominican Republic and supported mock trials in Colombia and Cost Rica. It has also developed model legislation and supported domestic anti-money laundering policies in a range of countries, including Colombia and Peru. See UNODC (2012).

135 See http://cicad.oas.org/lavado_activos/grupoexpertos/Decomiso%20y%20ED/Model%20Law%20on%20in%20Rem%20Forfeiture.pdf.

136 See <http://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/badec195.html>.

137 These activities are intended to assist with asset seizure and deprive launderers of profits, while also identifying means of generating funding for anti-drug law enforcement programs and demand reduction programs.

138 See EU (2012d) and World Bank (2009).

139 See http://cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/lavado_activos/grupoexpertos/ge_lavadoactivos_eng.asp.

Colombia¹⁴⁰, Guatemala¹⁴¹, Honduras¹⁴², and Peru¹⁴³ have established forfeiture legislation with support from the OAS and the United States, and are starting to assist other countries in the region.

Cooperation to combat cyber-crime

Although gradual, there is widening awareness of the extent of cyber criminality across Latin America.¹⁴⁴ Unlike in North America, Europe and parts of Asia, governments in South and Central America are less preoccupied with issues of cyber-war or cyber-terrorism than with criminal practices of individuals and crime networks connected to the Internet with the intention of making illicit economic gains. Common examples range from e-banking scams to drug trafficking and child pornography. What is more, there is a growing preoccupation with hacktivist groups targeting official institutions and agencies with the intent of expressing political and social grievances. Such activities entail the closing down of official websites of government bodies and private sector entities and, in some cases, the theft of ostensibly confidential information, though not necessarily with the express purpose of economic gain. The rapid increase in connectivity to the internet in Latin America over the past decade has increased the overall volume and exposure to associated cyber threats. Over the past decade the number of internet users in South America has increased tenfold (1,111 per cent) and fifteen times in Central America (1,480 per cent). By 2011, internet penetration in South America and Central America reached 43 per cent and 32.6 per cent of the population respectively.¹⁴⁵ Likewise, 3G mobile phone subscriptions also increased tenfold across Latin America during the same period.¹⁴⁶ Latin America registered amongst the highest rate of growth in mobile services globally.¹⁴⁷

There are also concerns that drug trafficking organizations and organized gangs across Central and South America - often in collusion with Latino gangs in the United States - are migrating online.¹⁴⁸ This coincides with fears of so-called third generation and transnational gangs that are believed to be operating from California and Sinaloa to Tegucigalpa and Medellin.¹⁴⁹ Latin America is not alone in this regard: Interpol recently reported that upwards 80 per

140 See http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/PDF/CO/ley_793.pdf.

141 See http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/PDF/GT/decreto_congresional_55-2010.pdf.

142 See http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/PDF/HN/decreto_legislativo_153-2010.pdf.

143 See http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/PDF/PE/ley_29212.pdf.

144 See Muggah and Diniz (2013) and Diniz and Muggah (2012).

145 Although internet penetration in LAC is still below the rates of North America (78.6 per cent) and Europe (61.3 per cent), it is far above the African and Asian average percentages (13.5 per cent and 26.2 per cent).

146 According to ITU data, between 2000 and 2010, in LAC region there was an average increase of 10 times in the number of mobile phones in the hands of its citizens. Countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay even have more than 1 mobile phone per inhabitant. Internet World Stats, <http://www.internetworldstats.com> (accessed April 19, 2012).

147 While behind Africa and Asia, Latin America was ahead of Europe and North America. Indeed, shipments of smartphones grew by over 117 per cent in 2010. Industry analysts predict that by 2016 smartphones capable of accessing high-speed Internet will account for over 50 per cent of all cell phone sales in the region.

148 See Wilson (2011).

149 See Muggah (2012).

cent of all global online crime is now connected to organized gangs operating across borders.¹⁵⁰ There is also a surge in social media reporting on the mobilization of criminal gangs and cartels, not least the erstwhile website *Blog del Narco*.¹⁵¹ Yet it appears the involvement of organized gangs on the net is growing more intractable, not less. Criminal groups from Latin America are also learning from more experienced cybercriminals in Eastern Europe. And at the epicenter of this growth industry is Brazil - a country that routinely features in the top ranking of cyber-crime across Latin America.¹⁵²

Alongside more conventional cyber-crime is a recent increase in more politicized forms of cyber-criminality. In contrast to internet activism, hacktivism is generating a host of challenges to public and private actors alike. The key means tend to include denial-of-service attacks (DoS) or distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) that can shut down institutional websites for extended periods and limit access to key resources to intended users. Another common practice relates to stealing confidential information from designated authorities and institutions with the goal of making it available to the general public or extracting concessions. A difficulty in addressing hacktivism is that the political agendas of its proponents are often opaque and vary from group to group, many of whom are highly dispersed and exhibit dynamic membership structures. Two key groups - Anonymous and LulzSec - are widely known in Latin America and have been involved in launching DoS and DDoS attacks on governments, private corporations, banks and even narco-cartels in Mexico.

The principal international instrument for mobilizing international cooperation on cyber-crime is the Council of Europe's *Convention on Cyber-crime* (or "Budapest Convention"). It is the only binding international instrument dealing with cyber-crime and it was opened to signatures in 2001, entering into force in 2004. Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States participated in its elaboration and signed the final document, although only the United States has had it ratified. While the *Convention* is not limited to members of the Council of Europe, it has yet to be endorsed by Latin American countries. Not one Latin American country has acceded to the *Protocol*. Although a few Latin American and Caribbean countries have been invited to join the *Convention*¹⁵³, few meet the minimum requirements to accede.¹⁵⁴ Many also object to the perceived Euro-centric nature of the *Convention*'s drafting and content. Indeed, Latin American countries are largely absent from wider strategic international debates on cyberspace.

Meanwhile, most countries in Latin America have quietly developed strategies to deal with cyber-crime in line with the OAS's *Comprehensive Inter-American Strategy to Combat Threats to Cyber-security*. Adopted by the OAS General Assembly in 2004, the strategy is overseen by the Committee on Hemispheric Security and three departments that manage implementation: (i) the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE); (ii) the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL); and (iii) the Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber-Crime from the

150 See Weizman (2012).

151 See <http://www.blogdelnarco.com/>.

152 See, for example, the Norton Cyber-crime Report at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/home_homeoffice/html/ncr/ and the Symanteccloud Report at http://www.symanteccloud.com/globalthreats/overview/r_mli_reports?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_marketwire_linkedin_2011Oct_worldwide_intelligencereportoct2011.

153 Countries such as Argentina, Chile, Cost Rica, Dominican Republic and Mexico have been invited.

154 The requirements for entry include the existence of a specific legal framework covering all categories of cyber-crime, solid procedural legislation, an advanced state of international cooperation, and the existence of a CSIRT.

Meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA).¹⁵⁵ In addition to providing technical assistance, these entities draw attention to key issues through conferences, seminars and exchanges, as well as support for establishing computer security incident response teams, or CSIRTs.¹⁵⁶

A number of other international cooperation mechanisms also support cyber-crime capabilities and response across Latin America. For example, some Latin American countries are receiving assistance through the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Key modalities of support from ECLAC include technical assistance and information provided by the Observatory for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC), established in 2003.¹⁵⁷ Likewise, UNASUR has also held meetings between the Defense, Justice and Interior Ministers among its twelve members in order to review their cyber-defence capabilities.¹⁵⁸ Meanwhile, the Andean Community has called attention to the issue since 2004 when it established a common external security policy. The policy includes provisions for more cooperation and coordination of national actions.¹⁵⁹ Other mechanisms such as the Network of e-Government Leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean (RedGEALC)¹⁶⁰ and the Latin American Forum of Telecommunications Regulators (Regulatel), including 20 government regulators¹⁶¹, are involved in aspects of information security and cyber-crime.

There is comparatively less publicly available evidence of bilateral cooperation between Latin America countries on managing cyber-security and cyber-defense. While this is a possible area of growth, just one country has signed a treaty - Brazil - with another country outside of Latin America - Russia. The *Agreement on Non-Aggression by Information Weapons* was signed in 2010 and represents the first bilateral agreement of its kind. In addition to a pact of non-aggression in the case of a conventional war, the agreement calls for information exchange, capacity strengthening and joint cyber-war exercises. Meanwhile, the Defense Ministers of Argentina and Brazil also signed a 2011 *Joint Declaration* to review bilateral cooperation across the defense sector, with one clause specifically calling for increased cooperation on informatics and cyber-defense. Likewise, Defense Ministers from Brazil, Chile and Colombia are also exploring collaboration with the United States regarding cyber threats such as hacktivism and have urged for the hardening of computer networks against breaches and increased cooperation.¹⁶²

155 Communication with Adam Blackwell, Secretary for OAS Multidimensional Security, in April 2012.

156 The CSIRT concept emerged in 1988 following the Morris worm incident, with the creation of the so-called coordination center at the software engineering institute (CERT), a US FF RDC operated by Carnegie Mellon University. The model was soon replicated in the US and abroad.

157 Even so, OSILAC still only produces general statistics that are only partly helpful in relation to addressing cybercrime. Interview with Bernardo Sorj, July 2013.

158 Approaches to containing transnational organized crime were reviewed in February 2012, and the Defense Strategic Studies Center (CEED) established in 2011 will likely deepen its engagement on the issue.

159 See Colombian Government (2011).

160 See <http://www.redgealc.net> (accessed March, 05, 2012).

161 The list with the members of the organization is available at: http://www.regulatel.org/j/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114&Itemid=79 (accessed March 11, 2012). Regulatel also counts with three European observer agencies from Portugal, Spain and Italy.

162 See Baldor (2007).

SECTION IV

CITIZEN SECURITY COOPERATION TO ADDRESS LOCAL THREATS

Alongside cooperation to address transnational threats, Latin America has witnessed a surge in international cooperation focused on addressing regional and local citizen security threats from below. The rapid expansion in policies, programs and projects intended to prevent and reduce gender-based violence, youth violence, common street violence and state violence intimates a redirection of assistance away from transnational to local challenges. Prominent supporters of preventive approaches, whether in terms of scale or duration of assistance, include bilateral aid agencies from Canada, Germany, and Spain as well as multilateral organizations. There is also evidence of some countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico attempting to step up their export of security and justice innovations to neighboring countries, particularly in Central America. While not necessarily providing equivalent aid in material terms, these countries are nevertheless exerting their “soft power” in the neighborhood.¹⁶³ The *Strategic Paper* also detects a sharp increase in city to city cooperation as well as between non-governmental and private actors in Latin America, many of them advancing preventive approaches to addressing issues of safety and security.

Bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote citizen security

There is a long tradition of North-South bilateral cooperation in the security, justice and development fields between European Union members and Latin American counterparts.¹⁶⁴ Owing to enduring historical and colonial ties, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and especially Spain have extensive forms of intelligence, defense, and customs exchanges with governments, parliamentarians, national police and justice departments, and civil society organizations across Central and South America. However, there are signs that the influence and reach of Western Europe is diminishing in Latin America as a wider array of actors enter the fray. It is likely that European Union delegations and member state embassies will significantly decrease their presence and aid portfolios over the coming decade, focusing primarily on low-income settings in Central America and countries such as Bolivia and Paraguay in South America.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, given its integrationist orientation, the European Union will also continue orienting its citizen security cooperation toward the promotion of regional programs and confidence-building measures.¹⁶⁶

The European Union and like-minded states tend to adopt a balanced approach to international cooperation for citizen security in Latin America. This includes more comprehensive strategies to addressing the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs. The 2005-2012 *European Union Drug Strategy*, for example, emphasizes punitive measures associated with containing the supply of cocaine but also demand-side programs focused on alternative development and health related interventions for at-risk populations and consumers. The European Union strategy has long been premised on the notion of shared responsibility between consumer and producing countries, as was recently acknowledged by the United States. And since a considerable quantity of cocaine generated in the Andean

¹⁶³ See Amorim (2013).

¹⁶⁴ See Labrousse (2005).

¹⁶⁵ See DCAF (2013) review of EU security and justice assistance for 2014-2020.

¹⁶⁶ See EU (2012c).



The Colombian armed forces have worked closely with US counterparts, including as part of a Security Cooperation Task Force.

PHOTO: U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY CPL. BRITTANY J. KOHLER

region, and in particular Bolivia and Peru, is destined for Western Europe and Russia, it is hardly surprising that interest in the region has also increased.¹⁶⁷ Likewise, when addressing issues of, *inter alia*, street crime, youth and gender violence issues, European Union members tend to privilege social and economic aid, including judicial and penal reform, the promotion of human rights and related priorities.¹⁶⁸

Bilateral cooperation for citizen security promotion tends to follow one of two pathways. Although some partners may limit their investments to budget support or the exchange and “twinning” of technical experts between two countries, other forms of bilateral cooperation may seek to simultaneously promote regional approaches that span a wide range of states.¹⁶⁹ A major focus of European Union delegation in Central America, for example, is on strengthening SICA with plans to promote integrated border security, the harmonization of legal systems, and improvements in intelligence sharing on issues of drugs, gangs, arms and money laundering. Meanwhile, European Union member states often work with partners in Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Ombudsman or elsewhere to provide strategic and routine support to police, justice or penal systems. For example, Spain, given its historical ties, common language,

¹⁶⁷ See Muggah and McDermott (2013).

¹⁶⁸ Examples of European Union interventions include Peace laboratories in Colombia, cooperation agreements with the Andean Community, and a so-called Cooperation Program between Latin America and the European Union on Drug Policies (COPOLAD).

¹⁶⁹ Examples include police exchanges between countries such as Brazil and Colombia with counterparts in Canada, Japan, Spain, the US and the UK since the 1990s. Some of these collaborations have resulted in the transferring of “models” of policing across settings. See <http://www2.forumseguranca.org.br/content/revista-solu%C3%A7%C3%B5es-e-desafios-2>.

and close proximity to governments in the region, has supported extensive police and justice reform in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Meanwhile, Germany has worked with local counterparts to support youth violence prevention and social co-existence programs in Central America and parts of South America, with investments in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua accounting for more than two thirds of its entire portfolio. A considerable proportion of these investments are also administered by multilateral agencies, discussed below.

The spending by bilateral agencies on citizen security is modest, especially when compared to counter-narcotics and the fight against organized crime discussed in previous sections. In Central America alone roughly \$2 billion was committed to the theme over the past decade.¹⁷⁰ If all of Latin America is included, the figure rises to approximately \$6 billion.¹⁷¹ While certain funds are provided directly to Latin American governments and civil society groups, the majority of these resources are ultimately committed to multilateral development agencies - including the IADB, UNDP and World Bank and private foundations and non-governmental organizations. In Central America, most resources transferred by multilateral agencies are provided in the form of grants, while there are also a few sizeable loans intended to advance citizen security. There is also a considerable proportion of international cooperation intended to promote “national” programs even if “regional” interventions are also growing in popularity. International cooperation is devoted to reinforcing and strengthening institutional capacity, preventing violence and promoting social cohesion and co-existence. A more modest amount of resources are allocated in interventions designed to support high-risk groups, promoting extra-curricular activities, employment generation, providing attention to victims of violence, and working with local governments.¹⁷²

Multilateral organizations unequivocally promote softer citizen security strategies, often aligned explicitly with national priorities. And while they are important actors in Central America, they are increasingly less present in other areas of South America. In the case of United Nations agencies, some of them are active in Latin America since the 1950s, their own cooperation with partners on issues of citizen security is relatively novel. It can be traced to the issuance of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) *Guidelines on Urban Crime Prevention* (1995) and the *Prevention of Crime* (2002). As for international financial institutions such as the IADB and World Bank, their cooperation in citizen security is more substantial and informed by statutory mandates. Under the rubric of citizen security a wide range of agencies have established literally thousands of interventions focused on security promotion.

The IADB was the first multilateral institution to initiate a major cooperation project addressing citizen security in the late 1990s. Since providing an initial \$57 million loan to Colombia in 1998, the agency has issued dozens of loans and grants across Latin America and is credited with encouraging improvements in safety and security.¹⁷³ The IADB provides this support in the context of development assistance, and in accordance with its mandate, and concentrates support along five key pillars - social prevention, situational prevention, modernization of police forces, improvements

170 Almost 90 per cent of these funds are committed and some 12 per cent are still not disbursed.

171 See Muggah and Aguirre (2013).

172 These tend to receive considerable support from Germany, Spain, the United States and the IADB. Ibid.

173 See <http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/citizen-security/citizen-security,1200.html>.

in justice systems, and promotion of rehabilitation.¹⁷⁴ Its primary instruments for international cooperation include investment- and policy-based loans, grants to strengthen institutions and generate knowledge, technical assistance, best practice guidance, support for monitoring and evaluation systems, and frameworks for regional policy dialogue and south-south cooperation platforms. Over the past two decades, a considerable proportion of its overall grant portfolio has been devoted to Central America, in particular, and a small group of South American countries.¹⁷⁵ Through a combination of financing mechanisms, the IADB has invested more than \$313.5 million on citizen security in Central America over the past decade, or roughly 21 per cent of all international and bilateral investment in the sub-region.¹⁷⁶ It has also recently announced the launch of a citizen security facility to promote and exchange information, management practices, and cooperation to catalyze crime and violence reduction across the region.¹⁷⁷

Likewise, the UNDP is also devoted to, among other things, citizen security promotion.¹⁷⁸ The organization draws inspiration from “human” and “community” security frameworks developed in the mid-1990s and invests in national, metropolitan and local programs and projects that support crime reduction and strengthen institutional capacities to design, implement and evaluate interventions. For the past decade UNDP has supported federal and municipal governments to enhance their abilities to engage on citizen security priorities in concert with other agencies such as the Pan American Health Organization, the United Nations Population Fund, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, UNODC, and others.¹⁷⁹ Regional offices of UNDP, while invested in comparatively modest support and investing predominantly in small pilot projects, are involved in supporting government counterparts on issues of justice and security, including in relation to designing policy frameworks, enhancing ministerial and parliamentary capacities, and supporting the sharing of best practices.¹⁸⁰ Like IADB, UNDP has also established a special fund with support from Spain to promote citizen security in Latin America.¹⁸¹

174 The IADB approach emphasizes institutional reform to enhance predominantly public sector entities. The focus is on enhancing state legitimacy and institutional capacity to maintain law and order and bring about more effective and efficient services. Specific areas of investment include (i) strengthening of financial intelligence units to prevent money laundering, (ii) support to prevent trafficking in persons, (iii) activities to enhance border security, and (iv) expert assistance to adopt and implement international and regional laws and norms. Likewise, the IADB supports investment in citizen action and enhance productive contributions to society. Communication with Nathalie Alvarado, October 2013.

175 See <http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Citizen%20Security/2011/Mapeo%20ppt%20English.pdf>.

176 A focus of IADB support is on comprehensive strategies that integrate institutional strengthening (54 per cent) with violence prevention (28 per cent).

177 See <http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2012-03-19/citizen-security,9878.html>.

178 See the latest UNDP regional citizen security report at <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human-development-report-for-latin-america-2013-2014/>.

179 See UNDP (2011b). UN-Habitat is also promoting safer cities across Latin America and the Caribbean and is stepping up engagement in the region with the launch of the Global Safer Cities Network (GSCN) in 2012. See http://www.onuhabitat.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&Itemid=25.

180 The UNDP partnership with Brazil has generated more than eleven separate citizen security initiatives such as Maranhão; Direitos Humanos para Todos - Preparando a SEDH para Trabalhar com Novos Temas, Democratização de Informações no Processo de Elaboração Normativa do Executivo, Medalha de Ouro, Construindo Convivência e Segurança Cidadã, SENASP and others. See UNDP (2011b) and http://www.abc.gov.br/abc_por/webforms/interna.aspx?campo=164.

181 See <http://www.fondoespanapnud.org/iniciativas-regionales/gobernabilidad-fortalecimiento-de-la-gobernabilidad-democratica/seguridad-ciudadana/>.

The World Bank is also invested in cooperation for citizen security through its social development unit which focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean. It signaled an intention to expand its portfolio in citizen security with the hosting of major events in Colombia (2013) and Mexico (2011).¹⁸² Since 2004, the agency has promoted so-called “primary prevention” intended to prevent violence before it occurs and “secondary prevention” targeting populations exhibiting risk factors. For example, the World Bank developed a Small Grants Program for Violence Prevention (SGPVP) in 2005 as part of a wider crime and violence prevention initiative, with some eleven projects selected in Honduras and Nicaragua.¹⁸³ Alongside loans and grants, the World Bank is also generating a knowledge base on criminal justice systems and expanding its work on criminal and justice sector institutions (particularly prosecutors’ offices).¹⁸⁴ The World Bank, like IADB and UNDP, also seeks to promote sharing of few experiences in and outside the Latin American context.¹⁸⁵

There are some examples of renewed efforts to coordinate multilateral actors on integrated approaches to citizen security, including through internal institutional reforms as well as external mechanisms such as pooled funding mechanisms. For example, international agencies such as the IADB, OAS, UNODC and World Bank have designed new financial, technical assistance and knowledge-based instruments to facilitate assistance toward citizen security promotion. Examples include specialized investment loans, policy-oriented credits, non-reimbursable technical cooperation, on-demand advisory services and various types of knowledge products. The CAF, for example, has stepped-up its support for citizen security in recent years by explicitly linking social development support toward youth inclusion as well as supporting research on related themes.¹⁸⁶ The United Nations Millennium Achievement Fund is one example of a mechanism designed to incentivize collaboration. The so-called *Security with Citizenship* (Segurança com Cidadania) project in three Brazilian cities is another nationally-based example of such an initiative.¹⁸⁷ In this program, agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF and UN-Habitat teamed up with UNESCO, UNODC and the International Labor Organization (ILO) to identify ways to prevent violence and strengthen citizenship in under-served areas. Similar mechanisms have also been attempted in, among other places, El Salvador through the *Building Social Capital to Reduce Violence project*.¹⁸⁸

182 See <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/26/inseguridad-america-latina-conferencia-cali> and <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:23298829~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258554,00.html>.

183 See <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/EXTLACREGTOPURBDEV/0,,contentMDK:21807687~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:841043,00.html>.

184 The World Bank operationalizes citizen security through several key sectors: (i) analytical work, (ii) operational engagement, (iii) advisory services and technical assistance, (iv) capacity building and (v) strategic partnerships.

185 For example, the report “Prevenção Comunitária do Crime e da Violência em Áreas Urbanas da América Latina: Um Guia de Recursos para Municípios” was based on South African experiences and the publication “Making South Africa Safe—A Manual for Community Based Crime Prevention”, elaborated by CSIR and ISS. See <http://www.csir.co.za/shs>.

186 The call for research focuses on a range of topics such as organized crime, illegal markets and the state; the role of educational and labor market opportunities on the incidence of crime, the effect of social policies on crime, the importance of drug-related violence linked to consumption and micro-trafficking, triggers of domestic violence, impact of public policies on domestic violence, gun control and crime, among others. See, for example, <http://www.caf.com/en/areas-of-action/social-development> and <http://www.caf.com/es/proyectos> for its project portfolio, including on citizen security.

187 The three cities are Contagem, Lauro de Freitas and Vitória. See <http://segurancacomcidadania.org/institucional/o-programa-conjunto/>.

188 See <http://www.mdgfund.org/program/buildingsocialcapitalreduceviolencenewtransitionelsalvador>.

Emerging power cooperation for citizen security

While minuscule in comparison to other forms of multilateral and bilateral cooperation, some emerging powers are beginning to explore possible international cooperation. Two players with a growing influence in the political and economic spheres include China and Russia and they in turn are precipitating more energetic engagement from the United States and the European Union. China and Russia feature growing linkages to certain countries in Latin America, including many stretching back to the Cold War era. And while both maintain bilateral diplomatic and defense ties, China's development investments have taken off. Chinese trade to Latin America and the Caribbean



Brazil's national public security force is involved in a range of crowd control measures.

PHOTO: ALLAN DE CARVALHO/AGÊNCIA MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA

is expanding faster than any other country and in 2012 exceeded \$140 billion followed by India and Russia (\$15 billion each), Turkey (\$7 billion) and South Africa (\$ 4 billion). Their growing presence contrasts with diminishing levels of cooperation from the United States, Western European countries and Japan, previously Latin America's most significant economic partners. Indeed, the sizeable increase in Chinese trade with the region has presaged the consolidation of Pacific facing countries across the Americas as expressed through regional organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. The latest projections indicate that Latin America is also second only to Africa in its receipt of development assistance, credit and loans from China, albeit none yet devoted to citizen security.¹⁸⁹

189 See US (2009).

The motivations shaping Chinese, Indian, Russian, South African, Turkish and other emerging country engagement in Latin America are complex and far from unified. A common thread is that they are all primarily strategic in nature (in relation to energy security and deepening diplomatic ties) and economic (in relation to accessing commodities, expanding defense agreements and deepening trade ties) in orientation.¹⁹⁰ As bilateral agreements between emerging powers and Latin America accumulate, the market imperative is a key incentive shaping the rush for an enhanced presence.¹⁹¹ Indeed, China's trade to Latin American countries has grown more than tenfold since 2000 and is now second only to the United States. By way of comparison, Russia is also one of the leading arms exporters to Latin America, albeit due in large part to sales to just two countries, Cuba and Venezuela, a fact not lost on countries in the western hemisphere.¹⁹²

Notwithstanding expanding security and economic ties, it is worth underlining that actual cooperation on citizen security is virtually non-existent. While difficult to tabulate, China spends just over one tenth of its aid budget on Latin America and virtually none of this is devoted to sectors typically associated with citizen security priorities. It has provided occasional relief assistance to countries such as Chile, Cuba, Ecuador and Mexico and has a record of providing small projects, grants and loans that extends back to the early 1990s.¹⁹³ Likewise, India does not include Latin America in its list of priority regions and thus provides no assistance, security-oriented or otherwise. And with the exception of some agreements on non-intervention and cyber-security, Russian¹⁹⁴, Turkish and South African cooperation is non-existent.¹⁹⁵ Apart from tenuous multilateral forums such as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) group where modest project funds are potentially available for co-sponsored projects in Africa, there is virtually no investment in citizen security cooperation whether in the form of technical assistance, joint exercises, transfers or officer exchanges. There are just a small scattering of examples of discrete bilateral arrangements¹⁹⁶ or as part of the BRIC and IBSA modalities.¹⁹⁷

190 Indeed, China invests heavily in infrastructure and natural resources to also influence positions on Taiwan: of the 24 countries in the world that recognize its independence, half are located in the region. Likewise, Russia also seeking to gain influence both in Venezuela through arms shipments but also in relation to natural gas. See, for example, IDRC (2007a, 2007b) and Brookes (2008).

191 See ECLAD (2012), Kumar (2010), Bridges (2012) and others.

192 See Defensanet (2011), Brazil Economico (2012).

193 See <http://www.aiddata.org/content/index/AidData-Raw/other-donor-datasets> and http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/21/c_13839683_9.htm.

194 Russia has started to explore some possible assistance in relation to police training in Nicaragua and Peru, but no agreements exist at present. Author visit to Managua and Lima in March and April 2013.

195 See IDRC (2008), GHA (2011a and 2011b), BRICS Policy Center (2011).

196 See Defesa Brasil (2009), Defesanet (2012a, 2012b), Gazeta Russa (2012).

197 See <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/>, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/04/development-ibsa-fund-packs-small-but-sustainable-punches/>, <http://www.observatoriousp.pro.br/brasil-e-india-vao-reforçar-cooperacao-em-defesa/>, <http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/5431/Comunicado-conjunto-destaca-cooperacao-tecnologico-militar-entre-Brasil-e-India>, <http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/5947/Brasil-e-Turquia-estreitam-cooperacao-no-setor-de-Defesa>, http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/2003/b_25/.

Non-governmental and private sector engagement on citizen security

There are signs that overall multilateral and bilateral assistance for security and development across Latin America are stagnating in the coming decade.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, owing to the steady rise in foreign direct investment flows to Latin America (including new commercial loans and workers' remittances) and the growth of economies there, development cooperation is also less significant as a source of global financing. What is more, the increasing emphasis of the United Nations on regional and South-South Cooperation is not just because such modalities potentially offer comparative advantages, but because of real reductions in more traditional forms of official development aid. However, countries and cities across the region have also experienced more steady inflows of non-governmental cooperation for citizen security priorities - including from non-governmental organizations, philanthropic foundations, private sector and business actors, and academic and research institutions. Some of these forms of cooperation are emphasizing new and innovative security models with possible application across the region. For example, business leaders from Rio de Janeiro in Brazil to Monterrey in Mexico are working with government counterparts and networks of partners to promote innovative public security projects and new forms of citizen action.¹⁹⁹

Private philanthropic organizations in particular are a key source of development cooperation, including on issues of citizen security. By operating outside of official channels, they can assume greater risks and invest in more innovative projects whether in relation to preventing street crime, promoting reductions in violence against women, or other forms of activities related to gangs and at-risk youth. While of course obstacles exist, they are also often more nimble and flexible, able to respond rapidly to crisis situations and reduce the risks of misappropriation by delivering directly to civil society groups. Comparatively little is known about their overall scope and scale or the characteristics of philanthropy for citizen security. Prominent examples over the past two decades include the OSF²⁰⁰, the Ford Foundation²⁰¹, Wilson Center²⁰², the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)²⁰³ and others have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on promoting citizen security exchanges, investing in pilot projects, harnessing new technologies, and supporting fellowships²⁰⁴ and exchanging good practices.²⁰⁵

The private sector is emerging as a critical player in shaping the direction of citizen security programs across Latin America. They are not uniquely investors in innovative public security programs - as prominently demonstrated in the cases of pacification programs in Rio de Janeiro - but are also acting as strategic partners by sharing management expertise and technical know-how. An exciting example of such cooperation is the *Tehuan* program launched by

198 Indeed, total development cooperation is estimated to have exceeded \$170 billion in 2010, compared with \$161 billion in 2008 and \$127 billion in 2006. Growth in nominal terms has slowed markedly, from 27 per cent in 2006-2008 to only 6 per cent in 2008-2010. See UN (2012).

199 See Muggah and Diniz (2013).

200 See <http://archive.blog.soros.org/2011/01/citizen-security-human-rights-and-philanthropy-in-latin-america/>.

201 See <http://www.fordfoundation.org/grants/grantdetails?grantid=115766>.

202 See <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/citizen-security>.

203 See <http://www.idrc.org>.

204 See <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/grants>.

205 See Aguirre and Muggah (2013) for a breakdown of spending by non-governmental and private actors on citizen security.

the Center for Security Integration (CIC) in Monterrey, Mexico.²⁰⁶ The online crime reporting platform is an initiative of business groups and citizen action associations seeking to prevent and reduce rampant victimization. Likewise, business groups have supported public authorities in Guatemala through the *Mejoremos Guage* program which advances results-based management practices, online observatories tracking crime and victimization, as well as transparency mechanisms to promote citizen action.²⁰⁷ Another example includes the *Alcatraz project* in Venezuela which is also promoting creative ways of inserting young at-risk populations into the labor market.²⁰⁸

A vast array of non-governmental organizations and academic institutions are also involved in advocating for and promoting citizen security across Latin America. Many of these are formed on the basis of partnerships and networks between the United States, Western European, and Latin American countries, while others work closely with municipal counterparts. Still others are forged on the basis of networks cultivated within and between Latin American societies, particularly university-based groups. While not usually focused on the “regional” situation, a considerable proportion of them are nevertheless invested in promoting rights-based approaches to public security and safety, often calling attention to the particular experiences and needs of vulnerable groups. Literally hundreds of international organizations spanning a range of sectors are involved in international cooperation.²⁰⁹ For example, networks such as Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) and others have invested in deepening knowledge networks and awareness on the opportunities and pitfalls of various security promotion strategies across the region.²¹⁰

Regional cooperation for citizen security

There has been a pronounced expansion in regional cooperation for citizen security promotion across Latin America. It is worth underlining that supposedly responses to transnational threats such as drugs, gangs, guns, and money laundering while cast as “regional” challenges and addressed by entities such as the OAS, are still frustrated by complex relationships between Latin American governments.²¹¹ As noted above, however, new regional mechanisms are also in some cases re-booting the international cooperation agenda and are more attuned to the complex sub-regional interests within Latin America proper. There has been a massive expansion in political and economic bodies such as the Latin America Integration Association (Aladi), ALBA, CAN, the South American Community of Nations (CASA), CELAC, MERCOSUR, SICA, and UNASUR all of which explicitly exclude Canada and the United States. Of course, the multiplication of such bodies does not necessarily translate into increased capability. Many of these entities lack robust institutional capacities and are in some cases side-stepped altogether. Moreover, the mandates and strategic plans of these entities are seldom shared by their members.²¹² Where there are some common areas of

206 See <http://cic.mx/>.

207 The program is supported by FUNDESA and CACIF. See <http://www.mejoremosguate.org/cms/>.

208 See http://www.proyectoalcatraz.org/home_eng.php.

209 See also Neild (2003).

210 See Aravena and Goucha (2001).

211 Examples of specific programmes such as CAIP, Operation Community Shield. See Ribando (2007).

212 Many states continue to harbor complex relationships with one another. For example, Colombia has challenging relationships with both Ecuador and Colombia. Chile and Bolivia, Colombia and Nicaragua, Nicaragua and Costa Rica all have territorial disputes which inevitably affect cooperation.

agreement is often limited to border management, intelligence and police cooperation, and other activities that may result in improvements in trade and immigration, but not much more.

The OAS, which excludes neither the US nor Canada, is deeply invested in supporting member states to strengthen their own domestic and bilateral military, policing, judicial, customs and immigration capacities to address the threats to citizen security. More than a decade before the launch of the 2012 *Report on Citizen Security in the Americas*²¹³ and agreement on the 2011 *San Salvador Declaration on Citizen Security in the Americas*,²¹⁴ the OAS was involved in advancing security cooperation amongst members. For example, in 2003 it noted how ‘new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation’, and that ‘the traditional concept and approach (to security threats) should be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional



Foreign Ministers participating in a UNASUR meeting in Quito, Ecuador.

PHOTO: UNASUR.ORG

threats’. The final result of this affirmation was the *condemnation* of ‘transnational organised crime, since it constitutes an assault on institutions in our states and negatively affects our societies’. The OAS has also emphasized assistance to states to address localized citizen security challenges, including through the harmonization of relevant legislation and the development of more capable public institutions.

There are practical examples of regional cooperation for citizen security emanating from the OAS. In addition to some of the transnational issues emphasized in the earlier section (e.g. drugs, gangs, small arms, cyber-security), a focus of OAS cooperation is in terms of facilitating information sharing²¹⁵ and technical assistance for individual states

213 See <http://www.oas.org/dsp/alertamerica/Report/Alertamerica2012.pdf>.

214 See <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2752>.

215 See <http://www.oas.org/dsp/observatorio/database/resources.aspx?lang=en>.

confronted with specific challenges.²¹⁶ For example, the organization works with SICA member states to deepen codification of multilateral and bilateral treaties and practices for extradition and prosecution of higher-order crime.²¹⁷ The OAS also promotes preventive interventions targeted at the 'national and regional' levels to expand opportunities for at-risk youth through education, employment, health and juvenile justice services. In what the OAS self-describes as a 'comprehensive' approach, it works to encourage members to 'foster partnerships at the national, regional, and international levels - among the public and private sectors, donors, faith-based organizations, and the Central American and Mexican diaspora - to leverage resources to address gang prevention'.²¹⁸

And while still largely rhetorical, there are also signs of other regional institutions adopting a more assertive stance on citizen security issues over the past decade. As early as 2001, the interior ministers of the Mercosur member countries, including Chile and Bolivia, signed the *Citizen Security Declaration of Asunción* which committed states to the promotion of social capital formation (see Estévez 2001). The CASA launched a *Declaration on Citizen Security in South America* in 2005. The expansion of citizen security promotion by Latin American regional organizations reflects a growing independence from the United States and European Union as well as a willingness to identify opportunities for internal cooperation. The recent formation of CELAC in 2012 by 33 countries (excluding Canada and the United States) is one example of an effort to boost regional integration and cooperation, including on the citizen security front.²¹⁹ Likewise, the 12 members of UNASUR which was formed in 2007 are also seeking to enhance security and development cooperation. It has already facilitated conflict resolution in reducing tensions between Colombia and Venezuela in 2008, resolving internal political instability in Bolivia in 2008, and also intermediary support in Ecuador in 2010. The ALBA, which includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela and a small number of Caribbean countries, appears to have lost some momentum, particularly since the death of former President Chavez in 2013.

Regional responses to citizen security are motivated as much by domestic priorities and capacities as by concerns with transnational threats. And while there are some criticisms about the ability and willingness of certain regional organizations to tackle serious organized crime, they appear to be stimulating activity at the national level. Indeed, membership in such entities appears also to be encouraging some states to take on more regional perspectives in their own citizen security plans.²²⁰ For example, while expressing some reservations about SICA's capacities, Colombia and Mexico are increasingly working with the entity to provide a range of services based on their own particular areas of expertise. The Panamanian Ministry of Social Development has also started to cooperate with neighboring governments, non-governmental organizations and interest groups to administer gang prevention programs. Nicaragua too has adopted national youth crime prevention strategy that includes involvement of police

216 See OAS (2009).

217 As one example, an OAS (2008) resolution commits member states to a multi-sector strategy to: "identify opportunities to conduct joint international law enforcement operations targeted against transnational criminal gangs operating in the region ... develop common and shared operational terms of reference related to the definitions of a gang, gang membership and gang-related criminal activities ... disrupt the gangs' criminal activities, dismantle their criminal infrastructure and investigate, prosecute and incarcerate their command and control structure and criminal participants ... and deter and deny, through bilateral and multilateral anti-gang law enforcement activities, the ability of criminal gangs to continue to engage in transnational criminal activities or to recruit new members."

218 The OAS (2008) strategy also actively supports 'efforts to provide rehabilitation and reintegration programs and services to returning deportees to prevent them from joining a criminal gang or continuing involvement with criminal gangs upon return'.

219 While still early days, there are indications that groupings such as CELAC could lessen the influence of the OAS.

220 Interviews with Latin American government representatives in 12 states between February and June 2013.

in preventive and rehabilitative efforts, including with bordering countries. Costa Rica, Belize and El Salvador also recently launched interventions emphasizing prevention and rehabilitation, some of them inspired by neighbouring countries.²²¹

Alongside regional approaches - which entail cooperation between states often with troubled relationships - is a rash of new sub-state actors consolidating networks to promote citizen security. For example, Latin America displays a growing number of networks involving state governors, city mayors, local police chiefs, and others seeking to cooperate across international borders. Organised in conjunction with regional mechanisms (or independently of them), these new forms of partnership offer an exciting avenue for addressing the citizen insecurity on the front-line. In 2010, for example, an international summit of cities resulted in the so-called *Bogota Manifesto* and the Cities Alliance for Citizen Security with 40 cities.²²² Related, another eight municipalities in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico²²³ established a separate network called the *Latin American Forum for Urban Security and Democracy* (FLASUD).²²⁴ Finally, the recently launched Global Network on Safer Cities is chaired by the former mayor of Mexico, and includes partners from Bogota, Los Angeles, San Salvador, Sao Paulo and others.²²⁵

South-South Cooperation

While recently acquiring more attention, there is in fact a long tradition of South-South Cooperation within and between countries of Latin America.²²⁶ Early examples included technical cooperation agreements between countries such as Brazil with its neighbors Colombia and Venezuela in the early 1970s and Cuba with Chile in the 1960s.²²⁷ The United Nations ECLAC describes the creation of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) in 1975 as a foundational moment and represented the shift from “economic and technical cooperation among developing countries” to what is today described as South-South Cooperation.²²⁸ SELA counted some 28 member countries from across Latin America and the Caribbean and included in its original charter a call for creating a system of consultation and coordination for the adoption of common positions and strategies on economic issues international bodies and forums. It also emphasized the fostering of cooperation and integration among countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. South-South Cooperation was also bolstered by the *Buenos Aires Plan of Action* in 1978²²⁹ and the establishment of the ECLAC Committee on Cooperation among Developing Countries and Regions the following

221 See United States Congressional Research Service (2012d).

222 See <http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2010-04-16/mayors-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-alliance-of-cities-citizen-security-idb,6993.html>.

223 The cities are El Rosario (Argentina), Araraquara, Riberirao, Petro and Porto Alegre (Brazil), Falndes and Chapinero (Colombia) and Mexico and Apeseo el Grande (Mexico).

224 See Raposo de Lima (2010).

225 See <http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=11600&catid=5&typeid=6&subMenuId=0>.

226 It is worth noting that in aggregate terms, most SSC occurs in Asia and the Middle East where the largest such donors exist (namely China and a number of Middle Eastern countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).

227 See http://www.abc.gov.br/abc_por/webforms/interna.aspx?secao_id=97&Idioma_id=1 and <http://www.mincex.cu/index.php/colabxdecadas.html>.

228 See <http://www.sela.org>.

229 See <http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/Key%20Policy%20Documents/Buenos%20Aires%20Plan%20of%20Action.pdf>.

year.²³⁰ It is worth signaling that all of these agreements occurred during some of the darker periods of Latin American dictatorships and involved little in the way of citizen security.

The expansion of South-South Cooperation continued across Latin America, albeit still comparatively modest when compared to multilateral and bilateral flows. For example, Brazil created its cooperation agency in 1987 with a view of promoting sharing of expertise and resources.²³¹ The Argentines followed with the creation of the Fund for South-South and Triangular Cooperation in 1992.²³² Both Colombia and Mexico developed cooperation agencies explicitly emphasizing South-South Cooperation decades later in 2011 and have started to support projects in Central America, including on citizen security.²³³ The total volume of such cooperation in Latin America is difficult to tabulate owing to differences in how countries manage and report expenditures. For example, in Central America, the total value of South-South Cooperation in dollar terms was modest, estimated at just \$45 million in 2011, including for investments in police support, special support for penal investigations, and programs to enhance capabilities to fight organized crime and narco-trafficking. By way of contrast, just one United Nations program, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), averaged some \$20 million a year until budget cuts in 2011 reduced the budget by 25 per cent.²³⁴ But it is also the case that many governments cooperate on hard security matters through bilateral defense channels, as the experience of Brazil and its neighbors in border control usefully demonstrates.²³⁵

While promising in theory, there are only a few examples of South-South Cooperation oriented toward citizen security promotion in Latin America. While these are clearly expanding political and economic ties between countries in the region, it is difficult to determine their impact. Most cooperation is oriented toward advancing social, economic and environmental development and based on the exchange of technical assistance and practical experience. Even so, there are some nascent examples of countries exchanging expertise, information and intelligence on softer security issues, though it is also still too early to assess whether these experiences are “successful”. As one of the first countries in Latin America to establish and implement a national public safety strategy, Chile has experimented with ways of transferring some of its experience to neighboring states. Its community policing policies (*plan de vigilancia por cuadrante*) are widely regarded as a model for youth violence prevention, penal reform and rehabilitation.²³⁶ In the meantime, in addition to expanding cooperation on border security, the Brazilian and Colombian governments have worked together since 2003 (with support from the United Nations) on a joint project called *Segurança Cidadanada*²³⁷ which is intended to share best practice on local policing and justice practices. Related, Brazil is cooperating with the Nicaraguan government to strengthen public policies to reduce youth violence²³⁸ while Nicaragua is looking to extend

230 See http://www.eclac.cl/cooperacion/noticias/paginas/4/25934/south_south_relevantevents.pdf.

231 See http://www.abc.gov.br/abc_por/webforms/interna.aspx?secao_id=12&Idioma_id=1.

232 See <http://www.cancilleria.gov.ar/dgcin.html>.

233 See <http://amexcid.gob.mx/index.php/es/acerca-de-la-amexcid/ique-es-la-amexcid> and <http://www.apccolombia.gov.co/?idcategoria=113#&panel1-6>.

234 See, for example, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemalas-un-backed-justice-commission-faces-budget-cuts>.

235 See Muggah (2013).

236 See Dammert (2013).

237 See Freire (2009).

238 See http://www.abc.gov.br/abc_por/webforms/interna.aspx?Secao_id=138&campo=405&s=Nicar%C3%A1gua&c=Nicar%C3%A1gua.

its “community policing” model to neighboring countries. Equally, in 2012, Mexico and El Salvador agreed to develop 30 new projects, some of which are intended to promote citizen security, and the Mexican government expects to expand such support across Central America in the future.²³⁹

Colombia offers an intriguing example of a Latin American country seeking to step up its international cooperation profile. The Colombian government supported more than 60 cooperation activities in 2010-2012, benefiting over 220 institutions and 50 national and local partners. It established partnerships with regional and international bodies²⁴⁰ as well as a small number of triangular arrangements with Australia, the United States and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF).²⁴¹ Colombia is seeking to re-position itself as a good global citizen and regional player, particularly in relation to the fight against organized crime and terrorism. Indeed, under President Santos, Colombia has expanded its cooperation profile since 2011, particular in relation to what might be termed “police diplomacy”. Specifically, the Colombian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense are actively supporting an international cooperation strategy to promote both hard and soft variations of citizen security.

In terms of cooperation in multilateral peace missions, Colombia already features a considerable level of cooperation, particularly when compared to neighbors such as Argentina, Brazil or Chile. For example, Colombia currently fields 34 police officers in UN missions (compared to Brazil’s eight military police officers serving in Haiti and Lebanon), including in Haiti with MINUSTAH (25), Guatemala and the CICIG (5), Guinea Bissau with UNIOGBIS (3), and Sierra Leone with UNIPSIL (3). The country supports 18 police attaches and more than 12 other units operating in cooperation with international partners.²⁴² Over the past few years, Colombia has also co-hosted training in kidnapping and terrorism with France (2011), Spain (2011), United Kingdom (2012) and the United States (2012). Colombia is also the current secretariat of AMERIPOL and has organized a rash of seminars across Latin America and Western Europe in 2011, 2012, and 2013.²⁴³ This is occurring at a time when traditional bilateral and multilateral aid to Colombia is steadily declining and the country is actively pursuing a peace agreement to end a four decade-long civil war.

On the basis of sizeable investments from the United States²⁴⁴ and Canada, Colombia is actively expanding its cooperation portfolio. The government has adopted a four phase model with prospective recipients that include “referral”, “planning”, “implementation” and eventually “follow-up and evaluation”. Over a short period, Colombia has support police training in Central America, South America, West Africa and Western and Eastern Europe. A key test case is Honduras where Colombia has initiated cooperation since 2010 in a bid to professionalize the police. A focus is on enhancing education and ethics as well as specialized training in counter-narcotics and anti-kidnapping

239 See <http://amexcid.gob.mx/index.php/es/prensa/comunicados/1484-aprueban-mexico-y-el-salvador-30-nuevos-proyectos-de-cooperacion->.

240 These include SICA, COMFAMA, UNODC, UE-PRELAC, REDIBEX-INLAC, and RIPS/OAS. In the coming year the APC division intends to develop a more coherent strategic plan with a focus on as many as 66 activities overall ranging from support for maritime and areal interdiction and chemical precursor controls to money laundering, interdiction and citizen security promotion.

241 Assistance has grown steadily in material terms from some USD 500,000 in 2010 to more than USD 2 million in 2013. Interview with APC, Bogota, April 2013.

242 Countries participating include Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Spain, US, France, UK, Italy, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, OAS, and members of the UN.

243 These include seminars in Quito 2011, Lima 2012, Spain, 2012, and others. It also includes police training counter-narcotics in Brazil 2013, policing and money laundering, Italy 2013, as well as related events in Colombia 2013 and Panama 2013.

244 In particular the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and the aid agency (USAID).



Colombian security forces with extensive experience in counter-narcotics are now involved in training thousands of counterparts in Mexico and across Central America.

PHOTO: POLICÍA NACIONAL DE LOS COLOMBIANOS

measures.²⁴⁵ Honduras has gone through the referral, planning and implementation process and passing through the evaluation stage in 2013. Colombia has also already initiated police training programs with counterparts in Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil. Colombia is also expanding cooperation into West Africa - Cape Verde, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Togo - and eventually with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).²⁴⁶ By far the most important partner, however, is Mexico, where more than 7,000 police were trained since 2009. In total, more than 14,377 police have been trained from 50 countries and by 673 Colombian trainers. Some observers are wary, however, of the ways in which such assistance represents the securitization of aid and is heavily informed by priorities set by the United States.²⁴⁷

245 Among the 15 areas identified by the police for training are: police organization, ethics, fight against drugs, citizen security (urban and rural), youth violence prevention, anti-kidnapping and anti-extortion, intelligence, criminal investigation, police education, technology, strategic communications, and police aviation.

246 Likewise, the country is developing relations with Kenya on similar issues.

247 Interview with Arlene Tickner, April 2013.

SECTION V

COOPERATION DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES

While Latin America is experiencing a growth in citizen security strategies and programs, these are not without many difficulties. For one, the overlapping and in some cases competing conceptions of “security” continue to generate contradictions across the region. While citizen security constitutes an explicit attempt to integrate transnational, national and local formulations and emphasize preventive approaches over repressive ones, there is no consensus on how it is defined. Indeed, most actors - whether governments, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, non-governmental agencies or otherwise - tend to interpret citizen security differently even if there are some agreements on broad concepts. There is a risk, then, that the concept is unevenly applied and coopted. A more sophisticated debate is required, then, on the parameters of citizen security in Latin America. This in turn could contribute positively to shaping investment in the future.

Even so, there are signs that the tectonic plates of international cooperation are shifting. Indeed, in spite of some dramatic increases in “hard” security to some countries in the region over the past two decades, the overall picture is one of progressively declining development cooperation. Reductions in aid are complemented with a growing reliance of Latin American economies on foreign direct investment, remittances, and other alternative sources of financing. While these shifts can be managed by some of the larger and more advanced economies including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, smaller land-locked and poorer countries in Central and South America are confronted with major challenges associated with declines in material assistance.²⁴⁸ The competition among some countries for an ever diminishing aid pool may result in increased competition and a reluctance to cooperation on the citizen security front. Coupled with continued tense relations between some countries in the Central and South America, there may be difficulties to incentivize collective action that could translate into effective regional strategies.

Arguably the greatest dilemma confronting citizen security in Latin America is connected to the extent of political will, corruption and capabilities of states in the region. At a rhetorical level, most governments in Central and South America concede that cooperation for citizen security - from the transnational to the local levels - is essential. All agree that a coordinated strategy is critical even if they may disagree over what constitutes the greatest threats confronting the region or how best to confront them. But as noted by one analyst, most citizen security cooperation takes place on a “declarative, rather than an operational, level”.²⁴⁹ The fact is that even the superficial imperatives of cooperation are routinely superseded by rivalries between states, some of whom have long previously been serious adversaries or rivals. The simmering territorial and trade disputes between Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and more recently between ALBA countries and others have long frustrated meaningful cooperation. Likewise, instability in certain countries, as in Honduras in 2009 or Venezuela in 2013 and 2014, has also on occasion frustrated regional cooperation and brought to light regional acrimonies and tensions.

It is important to recall that countries across the region exhibit different levels of political and practical engagement on issues of citizen security, particularly given vested domestic interests. For example, in Central America, there is uneven

248 See ECCLA (2008) and http://www.eclac.cl/cooperacion/noticias/paginas/7/25937/About_overview.pdf.

249 See CRS (2012a).

engagement and sometimes sharp disagreements with western donors, in some cases resulting in the slowing-down or even withdrawal of partners. Notwithstanding the proliferation of forums²⁵⁰ and increasing aggregate spending on citizen security programs, it remains the case that some countries are more committed than others to genuine improvements in criminal justice, law enforcement, penal systems, youth violence reduction or drug policy. This is because certain governments in Latin America, including those in which elites are benefiting from illicit economies and rents, may have an interest in sustaining the *status quo*. In some cases, diplomatic and political disagreements between partners may result in the maintenance of some forms of assistance (say military) and the collapse of others (such as development) resulting in highly skewed intervention strategies.²⁵¹

A critical challenge confronting international cooperation for citizen security is related to the capabilities of regional and national institutions themselves and associated cooperation and coordination dilemmas. While member states have publicly voiced support for the promotion of entities such as ALBA, CASA, SICA and UNASUR, it also remains they were in many instances born weak and kept that way. The best financed of them, the OAS, has a small secretariat and even there the US and Canada continue paying the bills. Often regional institutions commit to bold declarations but the follow-through is sporadic and ends prematurely before practical interventions are implemented. Partnerships with regional organizations are often pursued cautiously, since their progress is often described as incremental and difficult to measure.²⁵² Not surprisingly, exchanges continue to be unstructured and unsystematic, and a greater emphasis is needed on more predictable and better organized platforms to dialogue and share experience. Another challenge relates to the expansion of activities - or "mandate creep" - of regional entities, a growth that is often unsettling for some member states. SICA, for example, is an example of an entity that became involved in citizen security in spite of a mandate focused more narrowly on economic issues. Concerns are also frequently raised about the disproportionate influence exerted by stronger states, highlighting again the challenges of building confidence for citizen security in Latin America. The inherent weaknesses of regional institutions in Latin America will frustrate meaningful progress on citizen security on the ground.²⁵³

250 Examples of regional citizen security forums include: the Citizen Security Network within the Regional Policy Dialogue; the Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas (MISPA); the Meeting of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA); the Alliance of Cities for Citizen Security; and the Central American Citizen Security Strategy, adopted by the Heads of State of SICA in June 2011 (Guatemala), and others.

251 For example, the United States effectively ended the majority of its bilateral cooperation to Nicaragua in 2012 and 2013 due to a political dispute and grudgingly supports the so-called gang truce in El Salvador.

252 A US State Department official sums up his frustrations in the following way: "regional and sub-regional organizations are, in my view, largely worthless - as countries in Central America/Mexico often don't trust each other or work together: regional programs look good on paper and on photos on websites, but rarely produce concrete, sustainable results. Technical assistance should be directed to individual countries and tailored for each setting otherwise there is no accountability or way to assess impact."

253 See Mera (2007).

CONCLUSIONS

The growth and transformation of transnational and local threats is inviting new ways of thinking about international cooperation for security in Latin America. In the decades of the 1990s and 2000s, organized crime, illicit drugs and arms trafficking, human trafficking and cyber-crime have forced states across Central and South America to adapt their security postures and articulate both global and local challenges. In spite of strong reservations and legacies of mistrust, many Latin American governments cemented their commitments in regional and bilateral agreements and programs. Yet in the past decade, complex forms of youth violence, gender violence and street crime have also become more apparent in certain regions and countries, requiring more localized interventions. Today exhibiting the world's highest rates of homicidal violence, Latin American governments and civil societies are rethinking their approaches to the promotion of security, the primary and most unambiguous responsibility of the state.

These and other complex threats are generating tensions between what might be termed old and new ways of thinking about security. Ostensibly “national” approaches to security prevailed during the twentieth century across Latin America, focused as they were on threats to the state and public order from external actors. International cooperation thus emphasized a combination of military, policing, intelligence, and border security, often shoring-up repressive and coercive responses. Meanwhile contemporary twenty first century citizen security approaches have also emerged - in some cases as a reaction to coercive measures of the past - privileging the safety and dignity of individuals, their protection and respect for human rights. Predictably, international cooperation began to shift toward preventive policies and investments in community policing, access to justice, prison reform, and good governance, indeed, on “internal” dysfunctions.

While advertising very different approaches to containing threats, these two security architectures - national and citizen-oriented - co-exist in Latin America. They are uneasy bed-fellows and are themselves undergoing transformations. In some cases they are mutually reinforcing while in others there are strong dissonances and contradictory impulses. From the perspective of bilateral and multilateral donors, they also imply very different modalities and types of assistance. For example, the United States, European Union members, Canada and others supply hard defense, counter-narcotics and surveillance support through their political branches ostensibly to reinforce conventional security priorities. These same states, along with a number of other bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies, private actors and foundations, simultaneously provide more modest amounts of assistance to promote domestic police reform and anti-gang strategies, expand access to justice services, arms collection and drug demand reduction, and improve prison and correction conditions.

This *Strategic Paper* on international cooperation highlighted the scale and diversity of international cooperation for security. In examining the parameters of national and citizen security architectures, it considered their convergences, contradictions and dilemmas. Indeed, transnational and localized forms of insecurity are exceedingly complex, awakening understandable concerns of intervention and interference. While some Latin American governments are prepared to cooperate on confronting trans-regional threats through, say, counter-narcotics programs, indicting cartel leaders, campaigns against money laundering, or cyber-security, they tend to be more defensive when it comes to sharing intelligence and acknowledging and addressing challenges on the home-front, including street crime, gangs or sexual violence. These sensitivities and collective action dilemmas are exacerbated by comparatively

weak regional integration, the robust but diverging interests of outside actors, and weak multilevel agreements and ad hoc arrangements that are fragmented and lack teeth.

Notwithstanding these tensions, there has been an important “turn” from older national to newer citizen security paradigms in the first decade of the twenty first century. Indeed, when examining the different layers of international cooperation - whether United States-led support for counter-narcotics and organized crime, to bilateral, multilateral, regional and other exchanges - there is growing attention among many international players to addressing threats to citizens and communities. There is also a clear acknowledgement of citizen security in regional instruments, in some cases bolstered by international actors. As Latin American authorities take center stage in rolling back the war and drugs and experimenting with innovative, inter-sector and preventive policies and programs to diminish violence, they are offering up a new vision for security promotion. The challenge of the twenty first century, however, is whether they will succeed in its meaningful delivery.

REFERENCES

- Abeltran, M. and Isacson, A. (2012) *Background Paper*. Washington DC: WOLA and UNDP.
- Acevedo, B, Bewley-Taylor, D. and C. Youngers (2008) *Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment, the Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme*, Briefing Paper 16, September 2008. http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper_16.pdf.
- Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (1998) *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Aguirre, K. and Muggah, R. (2013) "Mapping Citizen Security in Latin America: A Review of the Evidence", *NOREF Research Paper*. Oslo: NOREF.
- Alonso, J. (2007) *Cooperación con países de renta media*, España, Editorial Complutense / Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales / Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación.
- Amorim, C. (2013) "Hardening Brazil's Soft Power", *Project Syndicate*, July 22. <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-more-robust-defense-policy-for-brazil-by-celso-amorim>.
- Arana, A. (2005) "How the Street Gangs Took Central America", *Foreign Affairs*, 84:3, May/June, 98-110.
- Aravana, F. and Goucha, M. (2001) *Seguridad Humana, Prevención de Conflictos y Paz en America Latina y el Caribe*. Santiago: UNESCO and FLACSO. http://www.unesco.org/securipax/seguridad_humana.pdf.
- Arias, D. and Goldstein, D. (2006) "Violent Pluralism: Understanding the "New Democracies" of Latin America" in Arias, D. and Goldstein, D. Eds., *Violent Democracy in Latin America: Towards an Interdisciplinary Reconceptualization*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Baldor, L. (2012) "US Sees South America as Possible China Counter". *Associated Press*, April, 28. Available at: <http://news.yahoo.com/us-sees-south-america-possible-china-counter-140345250.html>.
- Beato, C., Alves, BI and R. Tavares (2005) *Crime, Police and Urban Space. Working Paper 65*. Oxford: Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies.
- Beatriz, A., Sera Hoffman, J., Marmolejo, L., and Duryea, S. (2012) *Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence*. Washington DC: IADB. <http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?dctype=All&dclanguage=en&id=57146%20>.
- Bestuzhev et al. (2012) *Panorama Viral de América Latina en el 2011 y los Pronósticos Para el 2012*. Available at: <http://www.viruslist.com/sp/analysis?pubid=207271158>.
- Brasil Economico (2012) Rússia só aceita liberar carne do Brasil se vender mais arma", *Brasil Economico*. October 24, http://www.brasileconomico.ig.com.br/noticias/russia-so-aceita-liberar-carne-do-brasil-se-vender-mais-arma_123913.html
- BRICS Policy Center (2011) "BRICS, Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento e o Fórum de Busan". *Policy Brief*, <http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/uploads/trabalhos/3594/doc/1147811641.pdf>.
- Bridges Weekly (2008) "Russia Looks to Bolster Presence in Latin America", *Trade News Digest*, 12, 40 <http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/34580/>.
- Brookes, P. (2008) "Russia, China, Move in on Latin America", *Real Clear World*, November 26.
- Brownfield, W. (2012) "Security Challenges in Latin America", *Testimony*. State Department, March 29. <http://www.state.gov/j/in/rls/rm/187097.htm>.

- Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (2009) *CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security: Description*, <http://caricomimpacs.org/>.
- Chaux, E. (2012) *Educacion, Convivencia y Agresion Escolar*. Bogota: Editora Aguilar, Altea. Taurus and Alfaguara SA.
- Chávez, R., Sandoval, B. and Martínez, F. (2011) "Migración centroamericana de tránsito irregular por México. Estimaciones y características generales," Centro de Estudios Migratorios; http://www.inm.gob.mx/.../APUNTES_N1_Jul2011.pdf.
- Chiado, L., de Mello, J. and R. Soares (2012) *Spillovers from Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Bolsa Familia and Crime in Urban Brazil*, Discussion Paper Series. Rio de Janeiro: IZA.
- Colombian Government (2011) *Lineamientos de Política para Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa*. Bogotá: DNP/CONPES.
- Costa, G. (2011) "Citizen Security in Latin America", *Latin America Working Group Report*. Washington DC: Inter-American Dialogue.
- Cruz, J. (2009) "Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational Protection Rackets", *Global Crime*, November.
- Dammert, L. (2013) "Chile: Pasar de la Narrativa a la Gestión Efectiva", in Basombrio, C. Ed. *Seguridad Ciudadana en América Latina*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.
- Defesanet (2012a) Brazil-China Decennial Spatial Cooperation, <http://www.defesanet.com.br/brasilchina/noticia/5719/O-Plano-Decenal-de-Cooperacao-Espacial-Brasil-China>.
- Defesanet (2012b) "Brazil and Russia have just signed a defense cooperation agreement", <http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/9023/BRASIL---RUSSIA---Acordo-sobre-Cooperacao-em-Defesa>.
- Defesanet (2011) "Rússia considera América Latina mercado promissor para suas armas", November 11. <http://www.defesanet.com.br/geopolitica/noticia/3401/Russia-considera-America-Latina-mercado-promissor-para-suas-armas->.
- Deutsch, K. et al (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Diniz, G. and Muggah, R. (2012) A Fine Balance: Cyber-Security in Latin America. *Strategic Paper 2*. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute.
- Dudley, S. (2012) "Gangs, Deportation and Violence in Central America," *InSight Crime* Part II, 26 November. <http://www.insightcrime.org/violence-against-migrants/part-ii-gangs-deportation-and-violence-in-central-america>.
- ECLAC (2011) *India and Latin America and the Caribbean Opportunities and Challenges in Trade and Investment Relations*. New York: ECLAC. http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/1/45261/India_Latin_America_Caribbean_opportunities_challenges_trade_investment_2011.pdf.
- ECLAC (2008) *Trends and Challenges in International Cooperation and the Mobilization of Resources for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean*. New York: ECLAC. <http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/4/33144/2008-315-SES.32-Trendsandchallenges.pdf>.
- ECLAC (no date) *Regulatory Framework for SSC (UN and ECLAC)*. New York: ECLAC. http://www.eclac.cl/cooperacion/noticias/paginas/4/25934/south_south_regulatoryframework.pdf.
- Estévez, E. (2011) *Public and Citizen Security in South America: Trends, Controversies and Proposals*. Unpublished paper. <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Pubsecurity/ch1.pdf>.
- European Union (2012a) EU-Central America Association Agreement, *Part II Political Dialogue*. Brussels: EU. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147662.pdf

European Union (2012b) *EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020)*, Official Journal of the European Union C 402/1. Brussels: EU. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:402:0001:0010:EN:PDF>.

European Union (2012c) *Latin America and the Caribbean Region: Policy Framework*. Brussels: EU. <http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/index.cfm?lg=en&pg=latin-america-carib-4>.

European Union (2012d) *Europe and Latin America: Combating Drugs and Drug Trafficking*. Brussels: EU - AFET/EUROLAT.

European Union (2009a) *EU Drugs Action Plan for 2009-2012*. Brussels: EU. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:326:0007:0025:en:PDF>.

European Union (2009b) *Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation*, amended in 2009 by Regulation (EC) No 960/2009. Brussels: EU. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006R1905:20091018:EN:PDF>.

European Union (2008) *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*. Brussels: EU. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

European Union (2007) *Security and Development - Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council*. Brussels: EU. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15097.en07.pdf>.

Farah, D. (2012) *Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority*. Monograph for the Strategic Studies Institute. Carlyle: US Army War College. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117>.

Farah, D. (2010) "Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Mérida Initiative", *Working Paper Series*. Washington D.C.: Wilson Center and Trans-Border Institute.

FLACSO (2007) *Report on the Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Santiago: FLACSO.

Foreo, J. (2011) "Colombia Stepping Up Anti-Drug Training of Mexico's Army, Police", *Washington Post*, 22 January. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012106325_pf.html.

Friere, M. (2009) "Paradigmas de Segurança no Brasil: da Ditadura aos nossos dias". *AURORA ano III número 5*, <http://www.marilia.unesp.br/Home/RevistasEletronicas/Aurora/FREIRE.pdf>.

Garzon, J. (2013) "A Diaspora Criminal: O Alastramento Transnacional do Crime Organizado e as Medidas Para Conter Sua Expansão", *Strategic Note 11*, Igarapé Institute, <http://igarape.org.br/a-diaspora-criminal-o-alastramento-transnacional-do-crime-organizado-e-as-medidas-para-conter-sua-expansao/>.

Gazeta Russa (2012) *Cooperation between LAC region and Russia is moving slowly*. http://gazetarussa.com.br/articles/2012/03/29/latino-americanos_desenvolvem_cooperacao_com_russia_14364.html.

GHA (2011) "Non-DAC donors and the transparency of aid information" <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/non-dac-donors-and-the-transparency-of-aid-information-2846.html>.

GHA (2011) "Non-DAC Donors and Humanitarian Aid - Shifting structures, changing trends", <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NDDs-humanitarian-aid.pdf>.

Hagedorn, J. (2008) *A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture*. New York: Barnes and Noble.

Hagedorn, J. (2006) 'The Global Impact of Gangs', in Short, J.F. and Hughes, L.A. Eds. *Studying Youth Gangs*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

- Hakim, P. (2011) *Rethinking U.S. Drug Policy*, Inter-American Dialogue, February 2011. <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Rethinking%20US%20Drug%20Policy.pdf>.
- Hakim, P. and Covington, K. (2011) *Constructing Citizen Security in the Americas*. Washington DC: Inter-American Dialogue. <http://svc.summit-americas.org/sites/default/files/Constructing%20Citizen%20Security%20in%20the%20Americas.pdf>.
- Hume, M. (2007) 'Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs', *Development in Practice* 17:6, 739-751.
- IADB - Inter-American Development Bank (2012) *Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence*. Discussion Paper. Washington D.C.: IADB.
- IADB (2011) *Evaluacion y Buenas Practicas: Aprendizajes y Desafios para la Prevencion del Delito y la Violencia*. Washington D.C.: IADB.
- IAHCR - Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2009) *Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights*. Washington DC: IACHR. <http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2010/CP25032E.pdf>.
- IDRC (2007) *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The India Case*. Ottawa: IDRC.
- Jaeger, J. (2012) "The Long Road to Arms Trade Transparency in Latin America", *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*. <http://www.coha.org/the-long-road-to-arms-trade-transparency-in-latin-america/>.
- Jutersonke, O., Muggah, R. and Rodgers, D. (2009) 'Gangs, Urban Violence and Security Interventions in Central America', *Security Dialogue* 40:4-5, 373-397.
- Karp, A. (2009) *Estimating Civilian Owned Firearms*, Small Arms Survey Research Note 9. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Kumar, R. (2010) "India Expanding Relations with Latin America and Caribbean" -*The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomats - Plus*, May. http://www.hispanicindia.org/report/india_expanding_relations_with_latam_and_caribbean_.html.
- Labrousse, A. (2005) "Cooperation in Terms of Drugs between the European Union and Latin America", in Guizado, A. . Ed. *Drug Trafficking: Perspectives from Europe, Latin America and the United States*, available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/Drug_Trafficking_Europe_Latin_America_United_States.pdf.
- Loureiro, A. (2012) *Can Conditional Cash Transfers Reduce Poverty and Crime? Evidence from Brazil*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.
- Manwaring, M. G. (1993) *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Manwaring, M. G. (2007) *A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
- McDougal, T., Shirk, D., Muggah, R. and J. Patterson (2013) *The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Traffic Across the U.S.-Mexico Border*. San Diego/Rio de Janeiro: Trans-Border Institute and Igarapé Institute.
- Mera, L. (2007) "Obstacles to regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: Compliance and Implementation Problems". *Paper Series* 7 (8), April. See http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/GomezMera_ObstRegIntLatAmer_long07_edi.pdf.
- Mesquita Neto, P. (2006) "Políticas Municipais de Segurança Cidadã: problemas e soluções". *Análises e Propostas* 33, December, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/brasilien/05612.pdf>.
- Muggah, R. (2013) "Securing the Southern Border: Transnational Organized Crime and Brazil's Response", in Sorj, B. and Faust, D. Eds. *Security and Development in Latin America*. Sao Paulo: iFHC.

- Muggah, R. (2012) "The Transnational Gang: Challenging the Conventional Narrative", in Shaw, T., Grant, T. Cornelissen, S. Eds. *The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms*. Burlington VT: Ashgate.
- Muggah, R. and Aguirre, K. (2013) *Mapping Citizen Security Interventions in Latin America: Reviewing the Evidence*, NOREF report, October, <http://igarape.org.br/mapping-citizen-securityinterventions-in-latin-americareviewing-the-evidence/>.
- Muggah, R., Carpenter, A. and T. McDougal (2013) "The Inconvenient Truth About Gang Truces", *InSight Crime*, December 5, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-inconvenient-truth-about-gang-truces-in-the-americas>.
- Muggah, R. and Diniz, G. (2013) "Digitally Enhanced Violence Prevention in Latin America", *Stability Journal*, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/168>.
- Muggah, R. and Diniz, G. (2012) "A Fine Balance: Mapping Cyber (In)Security in Latin America", *Strategic Paper 2*, Igarapé Institute, [http://igarape.org.br/wp-content/themes/igarape_v2/pdf/Strategic%20Paper%202%20\(June%202012\).pdf](http://igarape.org.br/wp-content/themes/igarape_v2/pdf/Strategic%20Paper%202%20(June%202012).pdf).
- Muggah, R. and McDermott, J. (2013) "Peru's Drug Problem", *The Atlantic Monthly*, 18 April.
- Neild, R. (2003) "Human Rights NGOs, Police and Citizen Security in Transitional Democracies", *Journal of Human Rights* 2 (3).
- Nixon, R. (1971) "Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control," June 17, 1971. *Briefing transcript at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/WS/?pid=3047>.
- Organization of American States (OAS) (2012) *Report of the OAS General Secretariat on Activities in the CIFTA Framework from 2008-2012*. Washington DC: OAS. <http://www.poa-iss.org/bulletinboard/Default.aspx?g=posts&t=959>.
- OAS (2009) *Calendar of Activities of the Committee on Hemispheric Security for the 2009-2010 Term*. Washington, DC: OAS. www.oas.org/csh/english/workplan.asp.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2012) *Development Aid at a Glance - Statistics by region - 3. America*. Paris: OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/42139289.pdf>.
- Passel, J. and Cohn, V. (2011) "Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends 2010," *Pew Hispanic Center*. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/>.
- Raposo de Lima, A. (2010) *A Seguranca Cidada Como Politica Criminal Alternativa na America Latina*. Brasilia: UniCEUB. <http://www.repositorio.uniceub.br/bitstream/123456789/905/1/20836927.pdf>.
- Ribando, C. (2007) *Gangs in Central America*. Washington D.C.: USAID. www.ansarilawfirm.com/docs/CRS-Report-Gangs-in-Central-America-1-11-2007.pdf.
- Robinson, J. (2008) "La posibilidad de la cooperación" en Gottsbacher, Markus y Lucatello, Simone (compiladores), *Reflexiones sobre la ética y la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo: los retos del siglo xxi*, México, Instituto Mora, 1a ed., 2008, pp. 68-91.
- Rodgers, D. and R. Muggah, R. (2009) 'Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Central American Case', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30:2, 301-317.
- Rodríguez Vázquez, H. (2010) "La cooperación internacional para el desarrollo desde una perspectiva latinoamericana" en Pollack, Aaron (coord.), *Temas de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo: criticar, proponer, sistematizar*, México, Instituto Mora, pp. 9-34.
- Sampson, R., Morenoff, J. and T.Gannon-Rowley (2002) "Assessing 'Neighborhood Effects': Social Processes and New Directions in Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 443-78.

Sampson, R. and Raudenbush, S. (2004) "Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows", *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 67 (4): 319-342.

SELA (2011) "Relations of Latin America and the Caribbean with Africa: Current Status and Areas of Opportunity", http://www.sela.org/attach/258/EDOCs/SRed/2011/06/T023600004775-0-Relations_of_ALC_with_Africa__Current_status_and_areas_of_opportunity.pdf.

Sikkink, K. (1996) "The Emergence, Evolution, and Effectiveness of the Latin American Human Rights Network," in Jelin, E. and Hershberg, E. Eds., *Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Soares, R. and Viveiros, I. (2010) *Organization and Information in the Fight Against Crime: An Evaluation of the Integration of Police Forces in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil*. Rio de Janeiro: PUC.

Spencer, B. (1998) "Drug Certification", *Foreign Policy in Focus*, http://www.fpif.org/reports/drug_certification.

Sullivan, J. and Elkus, A. (2012) *Mexican Drug Lords vs. Cybervigilantes and the Social Media*. March. Available at: <http://mexidata.info/id3288.html> (accessed April 11, 2012).

Sweigh, J. (2013) "A Strategy to Reduce Gun Trafficking and Violence in the Americas", *Policy Innovation Memorandum* 36. Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/arms-industries-and-trade/strategy-reduce-gun-trafficking-violence-americas/p31155>.

Szabo, I. (2013) *Latin America Awakes: A Review of the New Drug Policy Debate*, NOREF Report, October. <http://igarape.org.br/a-america-latina-desperta-uma-visao-do-novo-debate-sobre-politica-de-drogas/>.

Szabo, I. (2014) "O Despertar da América Latina: Uma Revisão do Novo Debate sobre Políticas de Drogas", *Strategic Note 14*, Igarapé Institute."

Szabo, I., Garzon, J. and R. Muggah (2013) "Violencia, Drogas y Armas: Otro Futuro Posible?", *Strategic Note 8*, Igarapé Institute, <http://igarape.org.br/violencia-drogas-y-armas-otro-futuro-posible/>.

Tickner, A. (2007) "Latin America and the Caribbean: Domestic and Transnational Insecurity". *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*. New York: IPA.

United Nations (UN) (2012) *Trends and Progress in International Development Cooperation*, UN Economic and Social Council, 29 May.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2013) *Human Development Report for Latin America 2013-2014: Citizen Security with a Human Face*. New York: UNDP. <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human-development-report-for-latin-america-2013-2014/>.

UNDP (2011a) *Mapeo del Apoyo Multilateral para la Cooperación Sur-Sur en América Latina y el Caribe*. http://api.ning.com/files/y9F6Ftb2fm8YexVca3l8hyaC0wSdNwTeQrWDQIMwUrJqCB-WbmjletthnirJGoKsYamrE83qQpCpQlyWF6l9mK-a9ZAGDa3U/Mapeo_CSS_ES.pdf.

UNDP (2011b) *A Decade of Work on Citizen Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean 2001 - 2010*. New York: UNDP. <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/Decade%20of%20Work%20on%20Citizen%20Security%20and%20Conflict%20Prevention%20in%20LAC%20ENGLISH.pdf>.

UNDP (2010) *Official Development Assistance: Toward Human Resilience*. New York: UNDP. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_SustainingMDGProgress_Ch5.pdf.

- United Nations Lima Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development (UNLIREC) (2012) *Annual Report 2012*. Lima: UNLIREC.
- United Nations Office for Drug and Crime Prevention (UNODC) (2012) *Major Regional Drug Trafficking Trends and Countermeasures*. UNODC/HONLAC/22/CRP.1. http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/honlac/HONLAC-2012-22/CRP1_Current_situation_E_V1254866.pdf.
- UNODC (2012) *Firearms Within Central America*. Vienna: UNODC. http://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTASouthAmerica/English/TOCTA_CACaribb_firearmssmuggling_within_CAmerica.pdf.
- United States (2012) *The 2012 National Drug Control Strategy, Office of the President of the United States*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/2012_national_drug_control_strategy_executive_summary.pdf.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2013a) *Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress in 2013*, February 8, 2013, R42956.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2013b) *Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress*, February 19.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2012a) *Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012*, August 28, 2012, R42360, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=722243>.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2012b) *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond*, August 15, 2012, R41349, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf>.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2012c) *Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress*, February 21, 2012, R41731, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf>.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2012d) *Gangs in Central America*, November 26.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2012e) *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of Rising Violence*, August 2.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2011) *Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean*, September 9.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2009) *United States Congressional Research Service's Report for Congress*, February 25.
- United States Congressional Research Service (2006) *Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean*, December 15.
- United States Department of State (2012) *U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2012 Program and Budget Guide*, <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/fy2012/index.htm>.
- United States Department of State (2011) *Partnership for Growth: El Salvador-United States Joint Country Action Plan 2011-2011*, November.
- United States Department of State (2010) *Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Joint Statement of the Merida High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime*, March 29, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/162245.htm>.
- United States Department of State (2007) *U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico*. Washington DC: US Department of State. www.state.gov/p/wha/ris/89887.htm.
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2006) *Central America and Mexico Gangs Assessment*. Washington D.C.: USAID. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG834.pdf.

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFC) (2008) *Joint Operating Environment 2008*. Norfolk, VA: USJFC, available at www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf.

Universal (2011) "Con antecedentes penales, la mitad de deportados de EU, afirma el INM", *El Universal*, 7 de noviembre. <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/190571.html>.

Waiselfisz, J. (2008) *Mapa da Violencia: Os Jovens da América Latina: 2008*. Brasília: Instituto Sangari.

Walsh, J. (2012) "Just How "New" is the 2012 National Drug Control Strategy?", *WOLA Special Report*, Washington D.C.: WOLA. http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug_Policy/May/How_New_is_the_2012_NDCS.pdf.

Walter, M. (2011) 'US Boosts Funds to Fight Central American Drug Crime', *Christian Science Monitor*, June 24. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/0624/US-boosts-funds-to-fight-Central-American-drug-crime>.

Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) (2008) "Daring To Care: Community-Based Responses to Youth Gang Violence in Central America and Central American Immigrant Communities in the United States", *WOLA Special Report*. Washington, DC: WOLA.

Weizman, S. (2012) "Interpol Says Organized Gangs Behind Internet Crime Boom", *AFP*, May 8. <http://ca.news.yahoo.com/interpol-says-organised-gangs-behind-internet-crime-boom-204448909.html>.

World Bank (2011) "Social Interventions for Urban Violence Prevention", *Violence in the City*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Wilson, T. (2011) "Latin America's Criminal Gangs Get Tech-Savvy", *InSight Crime*, December 14. <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1976-latin-americas-criminal-gangs-get-tech-savvy>.

World Bank (2009) *Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Practical Guide for Bank Supervisors*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

The **Igarapé Institute** is a southern think tank devoted to evidence-based policy and action on complex social challenges. The Institute's goal is to stimulate humane engagement on emerging security and development issues. The Institute's approach is to: diagnose challenges through cutting-edge research; trigger informed debate and action across public and private spheres; design tailor-made solutions that are people-centered. The Igarapé Institute is based in Rio de Janeiro, with branches in Brasília and São Paulo. Igarapé features partnerships and projects in Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, Guatemala, the United States and across Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe. The Institute receives support from, among others, Norway, United Kingdom, the Bernard van Leer Foundation, the Open Society Foundation, the International Development Research Centre, the United Nations and private donors.

Layout
Scriptorium Design

Igarapé Institute
Rua Conde de Irajá, 370
Rio de Janeiro, RJ
Brazil - 22271-020

www.igarape.org.br

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY THE IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE

ARTIGO ESTRATÉGICO 6 - PREVENINDO A VIOLÊNCIA NA AMÉRICA LATINA POR MEIO DE NOVAS TECNOLOGIAS

ROBERT MUGGAH AND GUSTAVO DINIZ | JANUARY 2014

ARTIGO ESTRATÉGICO 5 - PROTEGENDO AS FRONTEIRAS: O BRASIL E SUA ESTRATÉGIA "AMÉRICA DO SUL COMO PRIORIDADE" CONTRA O CRIME ORGANIZADO TRANSNACIONAL

ROBERT MUGGAH AND GUSTAVO DINIZ | OCTOBER 2013

ARTIGO ESTRATÉGICO 4 - TO SAVE SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS: UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

CONOR FOLEY | AUGUST 2013

ARTIGO ESTRATÉGICO 3 - MOMENTO OPORTUNO: REVISÃO DA CAPACIDADE BRASILEIRA PARA DESDOBRAR ESPECIALISTAS CIVIS EM MISSÕES INTERNACIONAIS

EDUARDA PASSARELLI HAMANN | JANUARY 2013

ARTIGO ESTRATÉGICO 2 - A FINE BALANCE: MAPPING CYBER (IN)SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

GUSTAVO DINIZ AND ROBERT MUGGAH | JUNE 2012

ARTIGO ESTRATÉGICO 1 - MECANISMOS NACIONAIS DE RECRUTAMENTO, PREPARO E EMPREGO DE ESPECIALISTAS CIVIS EM MISSÕES INTERNACIONAIS

EDUARDA PASSARELLI HAMANN | MAY 2012



IDRC | CRDI

Canada

International Development Research Centre
Centre de recherches pour le développement international